This temperamental attitude was of help to Lord Midleton when on December 18th he expounded the position of himself and his friends in a very powerful argument, the more persuasive because the good will in his audience softened his habitual touch of contentiousness.  It had seemed to them, he said, that both in the Nationalist and Northern Unionist camp there was a tendency to consider dispositions out of doors and to conciliate certain antagonisms without considering whether they excited others.  He and his friends had determined to fix their minds solely on the Convention itself, and to pursue the purpose for which they were summoned of endeavouring after agreement within that body.  They were Unionists; but they had asked themselves what could be removed from the present system without disturbing the essence of Union; and in that effort they would go to the extremest limit in their power, without thought of conciliating opinions outside, and without any attempt to bargain.

On one point only he indicated that their scheme was tentative.  Defence was by consent of all left to the Imperial Parliament.  This implied, he held, an adequate contribution, and the yield of customs to be collected by the Imperial Parliament seemed roughly to meet the case, for the period of the war.  But this was not absolutely a hard-and-fast proposal.  In any case, after the war, the amount should be the subject of inquiry by a joint commission.

Apart from this, the offer was their last word.  It conceded to Ireland the control of all purely Irish services.  This included the fixation of excise, because excise on commodities produced in Ireland did not touch the treaty-making power.  Customs touched that power, and therefore customs, like defence, must be left to the Imperial Parliament.  But, he argued, Irish Nationalists were not asked to give up anything which had been conceded to them by any previous Home Rule proposal.

To all Unionists he said:  These proposals keep the power of the Crown over all Imperial services undiminished; they keep representation at Westminster—­a corollary from leaving the Imperial Parliament powers over Irish taxation; and by accepting the suggestions already agreed to, they give a generous representation to Unionists in an Irish Parliament.  This special representation of minorities was, he thought, sufficient to give a guarantee of “sane legislation” while it lasted; and he suggested that the period should be fifteen years.  These concessions, in his opinion, sufficiently protected Southern Unionists.  To Ulster he said, “We share every danger threatening you—­we have many dangers you need not fear.  Yet, we have no sinister anticipations.  Are you still determined to stand out?”

On the other hand, when so much of the full demand was conceded, were Nationalists insistent, he asked, on demanding what they had never asked in the discussions upon any Home Rule Bill?  Nationalist leaders had now the chance of leading a combination of all sane elements in the landowning and land-cultivating classes.  No Irish leader had ever before been able to present such an appeal to Unionist opinion as would come from the man who represented a Convention Party.