It is well to recall what he had in his mind.  After the suppression of the South African rebellion in 1914, one man only was put to death—­an officer who changed sides during an action.  No attempt was made to try accused persons before a jury; a special tribunal of judges was set up by the South African Parliament.  But their power of inflicting punishment was limited by the Parliament to a sentence of three years.  General de Wet, the chief figure in the rebellion, was dismissed without punishment to his farm.  That was the manner in which a strong native Government, realizing the possibilities of future trouble, dealt with an insurrection infinitely more serious in a military sense than that which broke out in Dublin.  But in Ireland there was no native government; and the announcement of Mr. Birrell’s resignation meant in reality that Mr. Asquith’s Ministry had abdicated so far as Ireland was concerned.  Quite properly, they had called in a competent soldier to deal with the military exigency.  Quite shamefully, they left him in sole authority to handle what was essentially the task of statesmanship.

Everybody saw that in such a case the need was to prevent a rebellious spirit from spreading.  Sir John Maxwell took the simple view that the way to secure this was by plenty of executions.  Knowledge of Irish history cannot be expected in an English Minister, still less in an English soldier; but it could have taught him how often and how ineffectually that recipe had been applied.  Still less could it be hoped that a soldier, in no sense bound to the study of contemporary politics, should allow for the effect of two factors which must certainly influence Irish judgment and Irish feeling.  The first of these was the precedent within the Empire created by General Botha’s Government.  This, I think, English opinion generally, and particularly English Imperialist opinion, wholly disregarded; but it was the point to which Redmond had instantly directed attention.  For him, the idea of an Imperial Commonwealth of States was a reality, and within one Commonwealth there cannot be two standards of justice.  The second factor was the licence accorded by a Liberal Government, and the sanction given by a Tory Opposition, to preparations for rebellion, and acts of rebellion, in Ulster.  This was generally recognized by public opinion, though I think deliberately set aside by Sir John Maxwell—­who perhaps is not to be blamed.  But the Prime Minister, who had been chiefly and ultimately responsible for the decision to let Ulstermen do as they liked, was specially bound to consider and provide for the consequences of that line of policy in the past as it affected the present development.  He was also, as the Minister responsible alike for carrying a Home Rule Act and for denying to it operation, specially bound in such a pass as this to be guided largely by the judgment of the man who but for that postponement would have been head of an Irish Government.  But, under the various