Certain things are unbelievable.  No officer and no man that ever lived could from a partisan feeling against Ireland have sought to rob regiments who had done and suffered such things as the Dublins and Munsters did and suffered at “V” Beach of whatever credit could be given to them.  Yet in such times as we were living in, the unbelievable is readily believed, and men saw malice in the suppression of what could not long be secret:  Ireland had too many dead that day.  What made the suggestion more incredible only gave a poignancy to resentment, for Admiral de Robeck was an Irishman, with his home some few miles from the regimental depot of the Dublins.

Two things, however, should be said.  If only in fairness to Admiral de Robeck, the explanation should instantly have been given:  it was never given in full until he came before the Dardanelles Commission, many months later, and it has not been officially published to this hour.  And further, whoever edited the despatch was presumably a soldier, and knew how jealous soldiers are, and how jealous their friends are for them, of every word that goes to the recognition of such service.  The effect of omitting the schedule ought to have been foreseen.

Even before the middle of August, when angry letters over this despatch were appearing in the Irish Press, other news began to come to Ireland, ill calculated to help recruiting.  The Tenth Division had come into action, but under the unluckiest conditions.  When the great attempt was made to cut across the peninsula by a renewed push from Anzac and by a new landing at Suvla Bay, the Irish were among the reinforcements told off for that surprise.  But from lack of room on the island bases it was considered impossible to keep them together as a division, and one brigade, the 29th, lay so far off that it could not be brought into the concerted movement on Suvla.  It was therefore sent separately to Anzac, and joined in with the Australians.  Broken up by regiments and not operating as a unit, it furnished useful support; but no credit for what the men did could go to Ireland.  The other two brigades, the 30th and 31st, were left under the command of their divisional general and were to attack on the left of the bay.  But owing to some defect in exploration of the coast-line, the movement was not so carried out; six battalions out of the eight were landed on the south of the bay and were attached to the right-hand force.  Thus, in the actual operations Sir Bryan Mahon had under his command only two battalions of his own men.  The remaining six operated under the command of the divisional general of the Eleventh Division, who delegated the conduct of the actual attack to one of his brigadiers.  It is sufficient to say that immediately after the action both these officers were relieved of their commands.  The same fate befell the corps commander under whose directions this wing of the concerted movement was placed.