Napoleon was to be less pliable.  And yet Haugwitz assured the Prussian King and council that he had looked Napoleon through and through, and had discerned an unexpressed wish to deal easily with Prussia.  As to his acceptance of these changes in the Schoenbrunn Treaty, Haugwitz felt no doubt whatever, at least so his foe, Hardenberg, states.  But the Prussian Ministers were now proposing, not the offensive and defensive treaty of alliance that Napoleon required, but rather a mediation for peace between France and England.  They were, in fact, striving to steer halfway between Napoleon and George III.—­and gain Hanover.  Verily, here was a belief in half measures passing that of women.

The envoy despatched to assure Napoleon’s assent to these new conditions was the very man who had quailed before the Emperor at Schoenbrunn.  Count Haugwitz set out on January 14th for Munich and thence for Paris; but long before any definite news was received from him, the Court of Berlin decided, on the strength of a few oily compliments from the French ambassador, Laforest, to regard the acceptance of Napoleon as fully assured.  Accordingly, on January 24th, the Government resolved to place the Prussian army on a peace-footing and recall the troops from Franconia, as a daily saving of 100,000 thalers might thereby be effected.  Never was there a greater act of extravagance.  As soon as the retreat and demobilizing of the Prussian forces was announced, the French troops in Bavaria and Franconia began to press forward, while others poured across the Rhine.  Affecting to ignore these threatening moves, the Prussian Court strove peaceably to acquire Hanover by secretly offering George III. a re-arrangement of territories, whereby the Hanoverian lands east of the Weser, along with a few districts west of Hameln and Nienburg, should pass to Prussia.  Frederick William proposed to keep Minden and Ravensburg, but to cede East Frisia and all the rest of his Westphalian possessions to King George, who would retain the electoral dignity for these new lands.[73] The only reply that our ruler deigned to this offer was that he trusted: 

“His Prussian Majesty will follow the honourable dictates of his own heart, and will demonstrate to the world that he will not set the dreadful example of indemnifying himself at the expense of a third party, whose sentiments and conduct towards him and his subjects have been uniformly friendly and pacifick."[74]

But by the close of February this appeal fell on deaf ears.  Frederick William had decided to comply with Napoleon’s terms and was about to take formal possession of Hanover.

The conqueror was far from taking that easy view of the changes made in the Schoenbrunn Treaty which the discerning Haugwitz had trustfully expected.  At first, every effort was made by Talleyrand to delay his interview with the Emperor, evidently in the hope that the subtle flattery of Laforest at Berlin would lead to the demobilization of the Prussian forces.  This fatal step was known at Paris before February 6th, when Haugwitz was received by the Emperor; and the knowledge that Prussia was at his mercy decided the conqueror’s tone.  He began by some wheedling words as to the ability shown by Haugwitz in the Schoenbrunn negotiation: