to grant an indemnity to the King of Sardinia, to allow Britain to occupy Lampedusa, and fully to assure “the independence of Europe,” if France retained her present frontiers.  But when the Russian envoy, Markoff, urged him to crown these proposals by allowing Britain to hold Malta for a certain time, thereafter to be agreed upon, he firmly refused to do so on his own initiative, for that would soil his honour:  but he would view with resignation its cession to Britain if that proved to be the award of Alexander.  Accordingly Markoff wrote to his colleague at London, assuring him that the peace of the world was now once again assured by the noble action of the First Consul.[260]

Were these proposals prompted by a sincere desire to assure a lasting peace, or were they put forward as a device to gain time for the completion of the French naval preparations?  Evidently they were completely distrusted by the British Government, and with some reason.  They were nearly identical with the terms formulated in the British ultimatum, which Napoleon had rejected.  Moreover, our Foreign Office had by this time come to suspect Alexander.  On June 23rd Lord Hawkesbury wrote that it might be most damaging to British interests to place Malta “at the hazard of the Czar’s arbitration”; and he informed the Russian ambassador, Count Vorontzoff, that the aim of the French had obviously been merely to gain time, that their explanations were loose and unsatisfactory, and their demands inadmissible, and that Great Britain could not acknowledge the present territories of the French Republic as permanent while Malta was placed in arbitration.  In fact, our Government feared that, when Malta had been placed in Alexander’s hands, Napoleon would lure him into oriental adventures and renew the plans of an advance on India.  Their fears were well founded.

Napoleon’s preoccupation was always for the East:  on February 21st, 1803, he had charged his Minister of Marine to send arms and ammunition to the Suliotes and Maniotes then revolting against the Sultan; and at midsummer French agents were at Ragusa to prepare for a landing at the mouth of the River Cattaro.[261] With Turkey rent by revolt, Malta placed as a pledge in Russian keeping, and Alexander drawn into the current of Napoleon’s designs, what might not be accomplished?  Evidently the First Consul could expect more from this course of events than from barren strifes with Nelson’s ships in the Straits of Dover.  For us, such a peace was far more risky than war.  And yet, if the Czar’s offer were too stiffly repelled, public opinion would everywhere be alienated, and in that has always lain half the strength of England’s policy.[262] Ministers therefore declared that, while they could not accept Russia’s arbitration without appeal, they would accede to her mediation if it concerned all the causes of the present war.  This reasonable proposal was accepted by the Czar, but received from Napoleon a firm refusal.  He at once wrote to Talleyrand, August 23rd, 1803, directing that the Russian proposals should be made known to Haugwitz, the Prussian Foreign Minister: