Prussia firmly at Antwerp, Liege, Luxemburg, and Cologne, also aimed at installing the Elector of Salzburg in the rest of the new Rhenish acquisitions of France; while the equipoise of the Powers was to be adjusted by the cession of Salzburg, the Papal Legations, and the line of the Mincio to Austria, she in her turn giving up part of her Dalmatian lands to Russia.  Prussia was to be the protectress of North Germany and regard any incursion of the French, “north of the Maine or at least of the Lahn,” as an act of war.  Great Britain, after subsidizing Prussia for 100,000 troops on the usual scale, pledged herself to restore all her conquests made, or to be made, during the war, with the exception of the Cape of Good Hope:  but no questions were to be raised about that desirable colony, or Malta, or the British maritime code.[56]

At the close of 1805, then, Frederick William was face to face with the offers of England and those brought by Haugwitz from Napoleon.  That is, he had to choose between the half of Belgium and the Rhineland as offered by England, or Hanover as a gift from Napoleon.  The former gain was the richer, but apparently the more risky, for it entailed the hatred of France:  the latter seemed to secure the friendship of the conqueror, though at the expense of the claims of honour and a naval war with England.  His confidential advisers, Lombard, Beyme, and Haugwitz, were determined to gain the Electorate, preferably at Napoleon’s hands; while his Foreign Minister, Hardenberg, a Hanoverian by birth, desired to assure the union of his native land with Prussia by more honourable means, and probably by means of an exchange with George III., which will be noticed presently.  In his opposition to French influence, Hardenberg had the support of the more patriotic Prussians, who sought to safeguard Prussia’s honour, and to avert war with England.  The difficulty in accepting the Electorate at the point of Napoleon’s sword was not merely on the score of morality:  it was due to the presence of a large force of English, Hanoverians, and Russians on the banks of the Weser, and to the protection which the Prussian Government had offered to those troops against any French attack, always provided that they did not move against Holland and retired behind the Prussian battalions.[57] The indignation of British officers at this last order is expressed by Christian Ompteda, of the King’s German Legion, in a letter to his brother at Berlin:  “My dear fellow, if this sort of thing goes on, the Continent will soon be irrecoverably lost.  The Russian and English armies will not long creep for refuge under the contemptible Prussian cloak.  We are here, 40,000 of the best and bravest troops.  A swift move on Holland only would have opened the road to certain success....  And this is Lombard’s and Haugwitz’s work!"[58]