The vindictiveness with which he had trampled on his foes, his almost superhuman lust of domination, and the halting way in which he met all overtures for a compromise—­this it was that drove the Hapsburgs into an alliance with their traditional foes.  His conduct may be explained on diverse grounds, as springing from the vendetta instincts of his race, or from his still viewing events through the distorting medium of the Continental System, or from his ingrained conviction that, at bottom, rulers are influenced only by intimidation.

In any case, he had now succeeded in bringing about the very thing which Charles James Fox had declared to be impossible.  In opening the negotiations for peace with France in April, 1806, our Foreign Minister had declared to Talleyrand that “the project of combining the whole of Europe against France is to the last degree chimerical.”  Yet Great Britain and the Spanish patriots, after struggling alone against the conqueror from 1808 to 1812, saw Russia, Sweden, Prussia, and Austria, successively range themselves on their side.  It is true, the Germans of the Rhenish Confederation, the Italians, Swiss, and Danes were still enrolled under the banners of the new Charlemagne; but, with the exception of the last, they fought wearily or questioningly, as for a cause that promised naught but barren triumphs and unending strife.

Truly, the years that witnessed Napoleon’s fall were fruitful in paradox.  The greatest political genius of the age, for lack of the saving grace of moderation, had banded Europe against him:  and the most calculating of commanders had also given his enemies time to frame an effective military combination.  The Prussian General von Boyen has told us in his Memoirs how dismayed ardent patriots were at the conclusion of the armistice in June, and how slow even the wiser heads were to see that it would benefit their cause.  If Napoleon needed it in order to train his raw conscripts and organize new brigades of cavalry, the need of the allies was even greater.  Their resources were far less developed than his own.  At Bautzen, their army was much smaller; and Boyen states that had the Emperor pushed them hard, driven the Russians back into Poland and called the Poles once more to arms, the allies must have been in the most serious straits.[342]

Napoleon, it is true, gained much by the armistice.  His conscripts profited immensely by the training of those nine weeks:  his forces now threatened Austria on the side of Bavaria and Illyria, as well as from the newly intrenched camp south of Dresden:  his cavalry was re-recovering its old efficiency:  Murat, in answer to his imperious summons, ended his long vacillations and joined the army at Dresden on August 14th.