It would be interesting to trace the different fortunes which awaited the idea of the equality of man in America and in France.  In America it has always remained strictly within the political order, and perhaps with the considerable exception of the possibles share it may have had, along with Christian notions of the brotherhood of man, and statesmanlike notions of national prosperity, in leading to the abolition of slavery, it has brought forth no strong moral sentiment against the ethical and economic bases of any part of the social order.  In France, on the other hand, it was the starting-point of movements that have had all the fervour and intensity of religions, and have made men feel about social inequalities the burning shame and wrath with which a Christian saw the flourishing temples of unclean gods.  This difference in the interpretation and development of the first doctrine may be explained in various ways,—­by difference of material circumstance between America and France; difference of the political and social level from which the principle of equality had to start; and not least by difference of intellectual temperament.  This last was itself partly the product of difference in religion, which makes the English dread the practical enforcement of logical conclusions, while the French have hitherto been apt to dread and despise any tendency to stop short of that.

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Let us notice, finally, the important fact that the appearance of Rousseau’s Discourses was the first sign of reaction against the historic mode of inquiry into society that had been initiated by Montesquieu.  The Spirit of Laws was published in 1748, with a truly prodigious effect.  It coloured the whole of the social literature in France during the rest of the century.  A history of its influence would be a history of one of the most important sides of speculative activity.  In the social writings of Rousseau himself there is hardly a chapter which does not contain tacit reference to Montesquieu’s book.  The Discourses were the beginning of a movement in an exactly opposite direction; that is, away from patient collection of wide multitudes of facts relating to the conditions of society, towards the promulgation of arbitrary systems of absolute social dogmas.  Mably, the chief dogmatic socialist of the century, and one of the most dignified and austere characters, is an important example of the detriment done by the influence of Rousseau to that of Montesquieu, in the earlier stages of the conflict between the two schools.  Mably (1709-1785), of whom the remark is to be made that he was for some years behind the scenes of government as De Tencin’s secretary and therefore was versed in affairs, began his inquiries with Greece and Rome.  “You will find everything in ancient history,” he said.[195] And he remained entirely in this groove of thought until Rousseau appeared.  He then gradually left Montesquieu.  “To find the duties of