of a rebellion of peoples, was thus left free to continue argument in London without any necessity of making formal protest and of taking active steps to support such protest[179].  The official relation was eased by the conciliatory acquiescence of Lyons.  The public anger of America, expressed in her newspapers, astonished the British press and, temporarily, made them more careful in comment on American affairs.  The Times told its readers to keep cool.  “It is plain that the utmost care and circumspection must be used by every man or party in England to avoid giving offence to either of the two incensed belligerents[180].”  In answer to the Northern outcry at the lack of British sympathy, it declared “Neutrality—­strict neutrality—­is all that the United States Government can claim[181].”

While the burden of American criticism was thus directed toward the British recognition of Southern belligerency, there were two other matters of great moment to the American view—­the attitude of the British Government toward Southern privateers, and the hearing given by Russell to the Confederate envoys.  On the former, Seward, on May 21, wrote to Adams:  “As to the treatment of privateers in the insurgent service, you will say that this is a question exclusively our own.  We treat them as pirates.  They are our own citizens, or persons employed by our own citizens, preying on the commerce of our country.  If Great Britain shall choose to recognize them as lawful belligerents and give them shelter from our pursuit and punishment, the law of nations affords an adequate and proper remedy[182].”  This was threatening language, but was for Adams’ own eye, and in the next sentence of his letter Seward stated that avoidance of friction on this point was easy, since in 1856 Great Britain had invited the United States to adhere to the Declaration of Paris everywhere abolishing privateering, and to this the United States was now ready to accede.

What Seward really meant to accomplish by this was not made clear for the question of privateering did not constitute the main point of his belligerent letter of May 21.  In fact the proposed treatment of privateers as pirates might have resulted in very serious complications, for though the Proclamation of Neutrality had warned British subjects that they would forfeit any claim to protection if they engaged in the conflict, it is obvious that the hanging as a pirate of a British seaman would have aroused a national outcry almost certain to have forced the Government into protest and action against America.  Fortunately the cooler judgment of the United States soon led to quiet abandonment of the plan of treating privateers as pirates, while on the other point of giving “shelter” to Confederate privateers Seward himself received from Lyons assurance, even before Adams had made a protest, that no such shelter would be available in British ports[183].