most popular advocate of the Northern cause, but there were many others, not named in the preceding list, constantly active and effective[1206].  Forster, in the judgment of many, was the most influential friend of the North in Parliament, but Bright, also an influence in Parliament, rendered his chief service in moulding the opinion of Lancashire and became to American eyes their great English champion, a view attested by the extraordinary act of President Lincoln in pardoning, on the appeal of Bright, and in his honour, a young Englishman named Alfred Rubery, who had become involved in a plot to send out from the port of San Francisco, a Confederate “privateer” to prey on Northern commerce[1207].

This record of the activities of Northern friends and organizations, the relative subsidence of their efforts in the latter part of 1864, thus indicating their confidence in Northern victory, the practical cessation of public Southern meetings, are nevertheless no proof that the bulk of English opinion had greatly wavered in its faith in Southern powers of resistance.  The Government, it is true, was better informed and was exceedingly anxious to tread gently in relations with the North, the more so as there was now being voiced by the public in America a sentiment of extreme friendship for Russia as the “true friend” in opposition to the “unfriendly neutrality” of Great Britain and France[1208].  It was a period of many minor irritations, arising out of the blockade, inflicted by America on British interests, but to these Russell paid little attention except to enter formal protests.  He wrote to Lyons: 

“I do not want to pick a quarrel out of our many just causes of complaint.  But it will be as well that Lincoln and Seward should see that we are long patient, and do nothing to distract their attention from the arduous task they have so wantonly undertaken[1209].”

Lyons was equally desirous of avoiding frictions.  In August he thought that the current of political opinion was running against the re-election of Lincoln, noting that the Northern papers were full of expressions favouring an armistice, but pointed out that neither the “peace party” nor the advocates of an armistice ever talked of any solution of the war save on the basis of re-union.  Hence Lyons strongly advised that “the quieter England and France were just at this moment the better[1210].”  Even the suggested armistice was not thought of, he stated, as extending to a relaxation of the blockade.  Of military probabilities, Lyons professed himself to be no judge, but throughout all his letters there now ran, as for some time previously, a note of warning as to the great power and high determination of the North.