she should promptly approve the Northern blockade effort and be cautious in criticizing its legitimate operation.  Both her own history and probable future interests when a belligerent, required such a policy far more important in the eyes of statesmen than any temporary injury to British commerce.  English merchants, if determined to trade with the South, must take their own risks, and that Russell believed they would do so is evidenced by his comment to Adams that it was a tradition of the sea that Englishmen “would, if money were to be made by it, send supplies even to hell at the risk of burning their sails.”

But trade problems with the South soon brought real pressure on the Government.  In January, while marking time until Mason should arrive at his post, the Confederate commissioners already in London very nearly took a step that might have prejudiced the new envoy’s position.  They had now learned through public documents that Russell had informed Adams he “had no intention of seeing them again.”  Very angry they planned a formal protest to the British Government, but in the end Mann and Rost counselled silence, outvoting Yancey[559].  On his arrival Mason ignored this situation and with cause for, warmly received socially in pro-Southern circles, he felt confident that at least a private reception would soon be given him by Russell.  He became, indeed, somewhat of a social lion, and mistaking this personal popularity for evidence of parliamentary, if not governmental, attitude, was confident of quick advantages for the South.  On the day after his arrival he wrote unofficially to Hunter, Confederate Secretary of State “... although the Ministry may hang back in regard to the blockade and recognition through the Queen’s speech, at the opening of Parliament next week the popular voice through the House of Commons will demand both."...  “I shall be disappointed if the Parliament does not insist on definite action by the Ministry[560]....”

Carefully considering the situation and taking the advice of many English friends, Mason and Slidell agreed that the best line to take was to lay aside for the moment the claim to recognition and to urge European repudiation of the blockade.  Slidell, arrived in Paris, wrote Mason that in his coming interview with Thouvenel he should “make only a passing allusion to the question of recognition, intimating that on that point I am not disposed at present to press consideration.  But I shall insist upon the inefficiency of the blockade, the ’vandalism of the stone fleet,’ etc[561].”  Mason was urged to take a like course with Russell.  Both men were much excited by a document a copy of which had been secured by Mann purporting to be a “confidential memorandum” addressed by England to the Continental Powers, asking whether the time had not come to raise the blockade.  No such memorandum existed, but Slidell and Mason believed it genuine[562].  They had great hopes of the opening of Parliament, but when that event took place, February 6, and the only references in debate were to the Trent and its fortunate outcome, Mason was puzzled and chagrined.  He wrote:  “It is thought that silence as to the blockade was intended to leave that question open[563].”  This, no doubt, was the consolatory explanation of his friends, but the unofficial interview with Russell, at his home, on February 10, chilled Mason’s hopes.