To answer this doubt, we must admit that, with the diversities and natural features of countries, and with the characteristics of the peoples therein, is entwined most intimately the jus gentium, as we call it.  Accordingly, in some lands some things are regarded as established, and classed with the jus gentium, but not in others; and some things lawful in certain lands are not so in others.  On the contrary, things that would be wrong for some would be lawful and jus gentium for others; while things wrong for others would be lawful and honorable to the first, because of the diversity of countries, customs, and race, whence arises this jus gentium.  Therefore we say that, if in Castilla, where neither the land nor people of these islands are known, this case were to be judged on only the things written and proved, nothing more than that these people were assaulters would be decided; and an order would be issued to proceed against them as against assaulters.  If these things should happen in Sierramorena, no orders would be given to destroy the towns near by; or, if in the Pyrenees, for that reason war would not be declared upon the Gascons or Navarrese.  For this would be esteemed a personal offense, and not one committed by the community.  But here, where we know the land, the people, and their abominable and long-standing customs, we must esteem it, not a personal, but a communal offense; nor must we presume amendment where ferocity springs from custom, now rendered almost natural instinct, and from the land being unconquerable.  Therefore it must be presumed that, if they are not punished by force superior to their own, they will grow worse each day; for they consider cruelty honorable, and esteem him most who kills most.  Therefore, with people of this nature, we apply the saying of Aristo—­namely, that it is lawful to make war on and kill like wild beasts, those people who live unsettled and wandering like wild beasts.  It is quite evident that Aristo means people harmful to others; for, even when they live like wild beasts, but are not harmful, war is not on that account lawful.  And inasmuch as these arguments extend to the Negrillos and Zambales, it is our opinion that the war must be judged as just or unjust rather by the condition of the land and people, the injuries that will be inflicted, and the little relief obtained by employing other methods, than by the severity of the injuries received.  It is no remedy to guard the roads, as is quite evident, because they do more harm in one night than the soldiers in a week.  Likewise it is no remedy to guard the villages, for the people are obliged to go to the fields, etc.  Consequently we say: