To appreciate aright this ugly phenomenon we must distinguish two kinds of venality.  On the one hand there was the habit of exacting what are vulgarly termed “tips” for services performed, and on the other there were the various kinds of positive dishonesty.  Though it might not be always easy to draw a clear line between the two categories, the distinction was fully recognised in the moral consciousness of the time, and many an official who regularly received “sinless revenues” (bezgreshniye dokhodi), as the tips were sometimes called, would have been very indignant had he been stigmatised as a dishonest man.  The practice was, in fact, universal, and could be, to a certain extent, justified by the smallness of the official salaries.  In some departments there was a recognised tariff.  The “brandy farmers,” for example, who worked the State Monopoly for the manufacture and sale of alcoholic liquors, paid regularly a fixed sum to every official, from the Governor to the policeman, according to his rank.  I knew of one case where an official, on receiving a larger sum than was customary, conscientiously handed back the change!  The other and more heinous offences were by no means so common, but were still fearfully frequent.  Many high officials and important dignitaries were known to receive large revenues, to which the term “sinless” could not by any means be applied, and yet they retained their position, and were received in society with respectful deference.

The Sovereigns were well aware of the abuses, and strove more or less to root them out, but the success which attended their efforts does not give us a very exalted idea of the practical omnipotence of autocracy.  In a centralised bureaucratic administration, in which each official is to a certain extent responsible for the sins of his subordinates, it is always extremely difficult to bring an official culprit to justice, for he is sure to be protected by his superiors; and when the superiors are themselves habitually guilty of malpractices, the culprit is quite safe from exposure and punishment.  The Tsar, indeed, might do much towards exposing and punishing offenders if he could venture to call in public opinion to his assistance, but in reality he is very apt to become a party to the system of hushing up official delinquencies.  He is himself the first official in the realm, and he knows that the abuse of power by a subordinate has a tendency to produce hostility towards the fountain of all official power.  Frequent punishment of officials might, it is thought, diminish public respect for the Government, and undermine that social discipline which is necessary for the public tranquillity.  It is therefore considered expedient to give to official delinquencies as little publicity as possible.