itself produces happiness.’[1] The author proceeds to discuss whether making use of money might be an act of liberality, and replies that ’as money is by its very nature to be classed among useful goods, because all exterior things are destined for the use of man, therefore the proper act of liberality is the good use of money and other riches.’[2] Moreover, ’it belongs to a virtuous man not simply to use well the goods which form the matter of his actions, but also to prepare the means and the occasions to use them well; thus the brave soldier sharpens his blade and keeps it in the scabbard, as well as exercising it on the enemy; in like manner, the liberal man should prepare and reserve his riches for a suitable use.’[3] It appears from this that to save part of one’s annual income to provide against emergencies in the future, either by means of insurance or by investing in productive enterprises, is an act of liberality.

[Footnote 1:  II. ii. 117, ad. 2.]

[Footnote 2:  Ibid., ad. 3.]

[Footnote 3:  Ibid., ad. 2.  ’Potest concludi quod accipere et custodire modificata sunt acta liberalitatis....  Major per hoc probatur quod dantem multotiens et consumentem, nihil autem accipientem et custodientem cito derelinqueret substantia temporalis; et ita perirent omnis ejus actus quia non habent amplius quid dare et consumere....  Hic autem acceptio et custodia sic modificari debet.  Primo quidem oportet ut non sit injusta; secundo quod non sit de cupiditate vel avaritia suspecta propter excessum; tertio quod non permittat labi substantiam propter defectum ...  Dare quando oportet et custodire quando oportet dare contrariantur; sed dare quando oportet et custodire quando oportet non contrariantur’ (Buridan, Eth., iv. 2).]

The question is then discussed whether liberality is a part of justice.  Aquinas concludes ’that liberality is not a species of justice, because justice renders to another what is his, but liberality gives him what is the giver’s own.  Still, it has a certain agreement with justice in two points; first that it is to another, as justice also is; secondly, that it is about exterior things like justice, though in another way.  And therefore liberality is laid down by some to be a part of justice as a virtue annexed to justice as an accessory to a principal.’[1] Again, ’although liberality supposes not any legal debt as justice does, still it supposes a certain moral debt considering what is becoming in the person himself who practises the virtue, not as though he had any obligation to the other party; and therefore there is about it very little of the character of a debt.’[2]

[Footnote 1:  II. ii. 117, art. 5.]

[Footnote 2:  Ibid., ad. 1.]