but might come the next day.  I hurried over to the White House and asked to be admitted.  A secretary came out and without any preliminary whatever told me in the lobby that they knew the contents of the letter, but that the State Department was the only place to go.  I had to wait till the next day.  But on that same day, the day before I was admitted, the administration, without a word to the Emperor or Government of Korea or to the Korean Legation, and knowing well the contents of the undelivered letter, accepted Japan’s unsupported statement that it was all satisfactory to the Korean Government and people, cabled our legation to remove from Korea, cut off all communication with the Korean Government, and then admitted me with the letter.”

On November 25th Mr. Hulbert received a message from Mr. Root that

     “The letter from the Emperor of Korea which you intrusted to me
     has been placed in the President’s hands and read by him.

“In view of the fact that the Emperor desires that the sending of the letter should remain secret, and of the fact that since intrusting it to you the Emperor has made a new agreement with Japan disposing of the whole question to which the letter relates, it seems quite impracticable that any action should be based upon it.”

On the following day Mr. Hulbert received a cablegram from the Emperor, which had been despatched from Chefoo, in order not to pass over the Japanese wires:—­

     “I declare that the so-called treaty of protectorate recently
     concluded between Korea and Japan was extorted at the point of
     the sword and under duress and therefore is null and void.  I
     never consented to it and never will.  Transmit to American
     Government. 
                         “THE EMPEROR OF KOREA.”

Poor Emperor!  Innocent simpleton to place such trust in a written bond.  Mr. Root had already telegraphed to the American Minister at Seoul to withdraw from Korea and to return to the United States.

No one supposes that the Washington authorities were deceived by the statement of the Japanese authorities or that they believed for one moment that the treaty was secured in any other way than by force.  To imagine so would be an insult to their intelligence.  It must be remembered that Japan was at this time at the very height of her prestige.  President Roosevelt was convinced, mainly through the influence of his old friend, Mr. George Kennan, that the Koreans were unfit for self-government.  He was anxious to please Japan, and therefore he deliberately refused to interfere.  His own explanation, given some years afterwards, was: 

“To be sure, by treaty it was solemnly covenanted that Korea should remain independent.  But Korea itself was helpless to enforce the treaty, and it was out of the question to suppose that any other nation, with no interest of its own at stake, would do for the Koreans what they were utterly unable to do for themselves.”

There we have the essence of international political morality.