this calamity is reported to have really disappeared
in consequence of the offering” (Ibid, p. 392).
Kalisch, in his anxiety to diminish as far as possible
the evidence that human sacrifices were enjoined by
the law, urges that the passage in Leviticus (xxvii.
29) merely implies that “everything so devoted
shall be destroyed. The extirpation of the men,
as a rule heathen enemies in Canaan, or Hebrew idolaters,
is indeed referred to a command of Jehovah, but it
is not intended as a sacrifice to him”
(Ibid, p. 409). Surely this verges on quibbling,
and is not even then borne out by the context.
Leviticus xxvii. deals entirely with private “singular
vows,” and the “devoting” (Cherem)
of “man and beast and of the field of his possession,”
is not the judicial devoting to destruction of an
idolatrous city or individual, but a special voluntary
offering from a pious worshipper. Besides, even
if such judicial duties were “the rule,”
what of the exceptions? There are several indications
of the practice of human sacrifice to Jehovah beyond
the two related by Kalisch (the command to sacrifice
Isaac is in itself a consecration by God of the abomination);
the curious account of Aaron’s death—whose
garments are taken off and put on his son, and who
thereupon dies at the top of the mount, having walked
up there for that purpose, clearly indicates that
he did not die a natural death (Numbers xx. 23-28).
Many think that “the fire from the Lord”
which devoured Nadab and Abihu (Lev. x. 1-5) denotes
the sacrifice “before the Lord” of the
offending priests. Kalisch demurs to these latter
charges, and to some other additional ones, but says:
“It is, therefore, undoubted that human sacrifices
were offered by the Hebrews from the earliest times
up to the Babylonian period, both in honour of Jehovah
and of heathen deities, not only by depraved idolaters,
but sometimes even by pious servants of God; they probably
ceased to be presented to Jehovah not much before they
ceased to be presented at all” (Leviticus, part
i., p. 396). We cannot here omit to notice the
command of God in Exodus xxii. 29, 30: “The
first-born of thy sons shalt thou give to me.
Likewise thou shalt do with thine oxen and with thy
sheep,” etc. As against this we read
a command in chap. xiii. 13, “All the first-born
of man among thy children thou shalt redeem.”
Here, as in many other instances, we get contradictory
commands, best explained by the fact that the Pentateuch
is the work of many hands. Kalisch says:
“It is impossible to deny that the first-born
sons were frequently sacrificed, not only by idolatrous
Israelites, in honour of foreign gods, as Moloch and
Baal, but by pious men in honour of Jehovah; but the
Pentateuch, the embodiment of the more enlightened
and advanced creed of the Hebrews, distinctly commanded
the redemption of the first-born” (Ibid, p.
404). Kalisch—we may point out—considers
the Pentateuch in its present form as post Babylonian,
and regards it as a reforming agent in the Jewish
community.


