Which Attributes of God would not be discoverable by us, did we not discern a difference in Things; as between Power and Weakness, Benevolence and no Benevolence, or its contrary; and betwixt directing means to an End, and acting at hap-hazard without any design, or choice:  A knowledge, which, by whatever steps convey’d into the mind, is no other than a seeing things to be what they are, and that they cannot but be what they are.

From which diversity and immutability in the Nature of things, there necessarily arises a diversity of respects and relations between them, as unchangeable as the things themselves:  wherein the Will of the Creator in reference hereunto is reveal’d to every intelligent Agent, so far as he is made capable of discerning these relations, dependencies and consequences; and whatsoever with respect to his own Actions, such a Being finds resulting from any of these as most conformable to the design of his Creator in making him such a part as he is of the whole, he cannot but consider as the Will of God, thereby dictated to him; since otherwise, God would act contradictiously to his Wisdom in making him what he is.

We being then indu’d, as we are, with a capacity of perceiving and distinguishing these differences of Things; and also with a liberty of acting, or not, suitably and agreeably hereunto; whence we can according to the preference of our own minds, act either in conformity to, or disconformity with, the Will of the Creator (manifested in his Works no less than the Will of any Humane Architect is in his) it follows, That to act answerably to the nature of such Beings as we are, requires that we attentively examine, and consider the several natures of Things, so far as they have any relation to our own actions.

Which attentive consideration of the Works of God objected to our view, implies an exercise thereupon of that Faculty in us by which we deduce, or infer, one thing from another:  Whence (as has been said) our knowledge immediately deriv’d to us from sensation, or reflection, is inlarg’d by the perception of remote, or distant Truths.  The more obviously eminent advantages accruing to us from which faculty of reason, plainly make known the Superiority of its Nature; and that its suggestions, ought to be hearken’d to by us preferably to those of Sense; where these (as it too often happens) do not concur.  For did we know nothing by Inference and Deduction, both our knowledge and injoyment would be very short of what they now are; many considerable pleasures depending almost intirely upon Reason; and there being none of the greatest Enjoyments of Sense which would not lose their best Relish, separated from those concomitant satisfactions which accompany them only as we are rational Creatures.  Neither is it our greatest happiness alone which is manifestly provided for in our being indu’d with this Faculty; but our much greater safety, and preservation likewise; since these require a capacity in us of foreseeing distant Events, and directing means to an End, oftentimes through a long train of Actions; which is what we can only do by that in us, whereby the Relations, Dependencies and Consequences of things are discoverable to us.