and in the other cities, put in all the State troops that were available from the three States, push forward as many veterans as Lee could temporarily spare from the trenches, barely leaving a skirmish line behind the works around Richmond and Petersburg, then as Sherman approached, fall upon him with all the concentrated force and crush him in the very heart of the State, or to so cripple him as to make a forward movement for a length of time impossible; while the railroads in his rear being all destroyed, his means of supplies would be cut off, and nothing left but retreat.  Then, in that event, the whole of Beauregard’s troops to be rushed on to Lee, and with the combined army assault, the left flank of Grant and drive him back on the James.  That the soldiers in the ranks and the subaltern officers felt that some kind of movement like this was contemplated, there can be no doubt.  It was this feeling that gave them the confidence in the face of overwhelming numbers, and nerved them to greater efforts in time of battle.  It was this sense of confidence the soldiers had in the heads of departments and in the commanding Generals that gave the inspiration to the beaten army of Hood that induced these barefoot men to march half way across the continent to place themselves in battle lines across the pathway of Sherman.  It was this confidence in the wisdom of our rulers, the genius of the commanders, the stoicism of the soldiers, and above all, the justness of our cause and the helping hand of the Omnipotent, that influenced the women of the South to bear and endure the insults of the Federal soldiers, and view with unconcern the ruin of their homes and the desecration of their country.  From the standpoint of the present, this would have been the only possible plan whereby any hopes of ultimate success were possible.  But to the people of this day and time, the accomplishment of such an undertaking with the forces and obstacles to be overcome looks rather far-fetched, especially when we reflect that Johnston, with fifty or sixty thousand of the best troops in the service, had failed to check Sherman among the mountain passes of North Georgia, or even to prevent his successful advance to the very walls of Atlanta.  That General Beauregard, with his handful of regular troops and a contingent of boys and old men, could accomplish what General Johnston, with a well equipped army of veterans, failed in, was simply a blind faith in the occult influence of Providence.

But it seems as if the department at Richmond had lost its head, and had no settled policy.  Telegrams were being continually sent to the Generals in the field to “Crush the enemy,” “You must fight a great battle,” “Either destroy him or so cripple his efforts to reach Grant, that reinforcements would be taken from Lee’s front,” “Why don’t you fight?” etc.  These were the encouraging messages Generals Beauregard and Hardee were receiving, but where were the troops to accomplish such work?  Generals from every