is itself constructed after the English model as it existed a century ago, and a general system of government is established, lacking in that unity and elasticity which are essential to its effective working.  On the other hand the Canadian cabinet is the cabinet of the English system of modern times and is formed so as to work in harmony with the legislative department, which is a copy, so far as possible, of the English legislature.

The special advantages of the Canadian or English system of parliamentary government, compared with congressional government, may be briefly summed up as follows:—­

(1) The governor-general, his cabinet, and the popular branch of the legislature are governed in Canada, as in England, by a system of rules, conventions and understandings which enable them to work in harmony with one another.  The Crown, the cabinet, the legislature, and the people, have respectively certain rights and powers which, when properly and constitutionally brought into operation, give strength and elasticity to our system of government.  Dismissal of a ministry by the Crown under conditions of gravity, or resignation of a ministry defeated in the popular House, bring into play the prerogatives of the Crown.  In all cases there must be a ministry to advise the Crown, assume responsibility for its acts, and obtain the support of the people and their representatives in parliament.  As a last resort to bring into harmony the people, the legislature, and the Crown, there is the exercise of the supreme prerogative of dissolution.  A governor, acting always under the advice of responsible ministers, may, at any time, generally speaking, grant an appeal to the people to test their opinion on vital public questions and bring the legislature into accord with the public mind.  In short, the fundamental principle of popular sovereignty lies at the very basis of the Canadian system.

On the other hand, in the United States, the president and his cabinet may be in constant conflict with the two Houses of Congress during the four years of his term of office.  His cabinet has no direct influence with the legislative bodies, inasmuch as they have no seats therein.  The political complexion of Congress does not affect their tenure of office, since they depend only on the favour and approval of the executive; dissolution, which is the safety valve of the English or Canadian system—­“in its essence an appeal from the legal to the political sovereign”—­is not practicable under the United States constitution.  In a political crisis the constitution provides no adequate solution of the difficulty during the presidential term.  In this respect the people of the United States are not sovereign as they are in Canada under the conditions just briefly stated.

(2) The governor-general is not personally brought into collision with the legislature by the direct exercise of a veto of its legislative acts, since the ministry is responsible for all legislation and must stand or fall by its important measures.  The passage of a measure of which it disapproved as a ministry would mean in the majority of cases a resignation, and it is not possible to suppose that the governor would be asked to exercise a prerogative of the Crown which has been in disuse since the establishment of responsible government and would now be a revolutionary measure even in Canada.