The mobilized forces were divided into three independent armies on a basis worked out by the general of the Prussian staff.

The First Army, under the command of General von Steinmetz, consisted of the VIIth and VIIIth Corps, and one division of cavalry; 60,000 men all told.  It was ordered to encamp at Wittlich and form the right wing.

The Second Army, under the command of Prince Frederick Charles, was 131,000 strong, and constituted the central army.  It consisted of the IIId, IVth, and Xth Corps of Guards, and two divisions of cavalry.  Its meeting-point was in the vicinity of Homburg and Neunkirchen.  The Third Army, under the command of the Crown Prince of Prussia, was to form the left wing, near Landau and Rastat, a strength of about 130,000 men.  It consisted of the Vth and XIth Prussian, and the Ist and IId Bavarian Corps, the Wuertemberg and the Baden Field Divisions, and one division of cavalry.

The IXth Corps, consisting of the 18th and the Hesse divisions, was united with the XIIth Royal Saxon Corps to form a reserve of 60,000 men, and was encamped before Mayence, to reinforce the Second Army, which was thus brought up to the strength of 194,000 men.

The three armies combined numbered 384,000 men.

There were still the Ist, IId, and IVth Corps, 100,000 men; but they were not at first included, as the means of railway transport were engaged for twenty-one days.

The 17th Division and the Landwehr troops were told off to defend the coast.  During the night of July 16th the Royal order for the mobilization of the army was issued, and when His Majesty arrived in Mayence, a fortnight later, he found 300,000 men assembled on and in front of the Rhine.

In his plan of war, submitted by the Chief of the General Staff, and accepted by the King, that officer had his eye fixed, from the first, upon the capture of the enemy’s capital, the possession of which is of more importance in France than in other countries.  On the way thither the hostile forces were to be driven as persistently as possible back from the fertile southern states into the narrower tract on the north.

But above all the plan of war was based on the resolve to attack the enemy at once, wherever found, and keep the German forces so compact that a superior force could always be brought into the field.  By whatever special means these plans were to be accomplished was left to the decision of the hour; the advance to the frontiers alone was preordained in every detail.

It is a delusion to believe that a plan of war may be laid for a prolonged period and carried out in every point.  The first collision with the enemy changes the situation entirely, according to the result.  Some things decided upon will be impracticable; others, which originally seemed impossible, become feasible.  All that the leader of an army can do is to get a clear view of the circumstances, to decide for the best for an unknown period, and carry out his purpose unflinchingly.