the press that this delay was intentional becomes unfounded when one realizes that the advance of the Russian army following January 30 was in consequence of the stipulations of the armistice, and did not constitute an advantage taken of an opportune moment.  The boundaries within which the Russian army is stationed today are the lines of demarcation expressly mentioned in the armistice.  I do not believe in any intentional delay from anywhere; on the contrary, I have confidence in the good intentions everywhere to send representatives to the conference speedily.  We certainly shall do our part to the best of our ability.

I now come to the most difficult part—­excuse me if I continue for the present seated—­I come to the most difficult part of the task set me, an explanation, so far as this is possible, of the position which Germany is to take in the conference.  In this connection you will not expect from me anything but general indications of our policy.  Its programme Mr. von Bennigsen has developed before you clearly and comprehensively, almost more so than nay strength at the present moment permits me to do.

When from many quarters the demand has been made upon us—­to be sure from no government, but only from voices in the press and other well meaning advisers—­that e should define our policy from the start and force it on the other governments in some form, I must say that this seems to me to be newspaper diplomacy rather than the diplomacy of a statesman.

Let me explain to you at once the difficulty and impossibility of such a course.  If we did express a definite programme, which we should be obliged to follow when we had announced it officially and openly not only before you, but also before the whole of Europe, should we not then place a premium on the contentiousness of all those who considered our programme to be not favorable to themselves!

We should also render the part of mediation in the conference, which I deem very important, almost impossible for ourselves, because everybody with the menu of the German policy in his hand could say to us:  “German mediation can go just so far; it can do this, and this it cannot do.”  It is quite possible that the free hand which Germany has preserved, and the uncertainty of Germany’s decisions have not been without influence on the preservation of peace thus far.  If you play the German card, laying it on the table, everybody knows how to adapt himself to it or how to avoid it.  Such a course is impracticable if you wish to preserve peace.  The adjustment of peace does not, I believe, consist in our playing the arbiter, saying:  “It must be thus, and the weight of the German empire stands behind it.”  Peace is brought about, I think, more modestly.  Without straining the simile which I am quoting from our everyday life, it partakes more of the behavior of the honest broker, who really wishes to bring about a bargain.