war, but a condition of affairs which all the powers of Europe, I think, have good cause to avoid.  I am almost tempted to call it making a morass of matters.  Let us assume that no agreement about what has to be done can be reached in the conference, and that the powers who have a chief interest in opposing the Russian stipulations should say:  “At the present moment it does not suit us to go to war about these questions, but we are not in accord with your agreements, and we reserve our decision”—­would not that establish a condition of affairs which cannot be agreeable even to Russia?  The Russian policy rightly says, “We are not desirous of exposing ourselves to the necessity of a Turkish campaign every ten or twenty years, for it is exhausting, strenuous, and expensive.”  But the Russian policy, on the other hand, cannot wish to substitute for this Turkish danger an English-Austrian entanglement recurring every ten or twenty years.  It is, therefore, my opinion that Russia is equally interested with the other powers in reaching an agreement now, and in not deferring it to some future and perhaps less convenient time.

That Russia could possibly wish to force the other powers by war to sanction the changes which she deems necessary I consider to be beyond the realm of probability.  If she could not obtain the sanction of the other signers of the clauses of 1856, she would, I suppose, be satisfied with the thought “Beati possidentes” (happy are the possessors).  Then the question would arise whether those who are dissatisfied with the Russian agreements and have real and material interests at stake, would be ready to wage war in order to force Russia to diminish her demands or to give up some of them.  If they should be successful in forcing Russia to give up more than she could bear, they would do so at the risk of leaving in Russia, when the troops come home, a feeling similar to that in Prussia after the treaties of 1815, a lingering feeling that matters really are not settled, and that another attempt will have to be made.

If this could be achieved by a war, one would have to regard, as the aim of this war, the expulsion of Russia from the Bulgarian strongholds which she is at present occupying, and from her position which no doubt is threatening Constantinople—­although she has given no indication of a wish to occupy this city.  Those who would have accomplished this by a victorious war, would then have to shoulder the responsibility of deciding what should be done with these countries of European Turkey.  That they should be willing simply to reinstate the Turkish rule in its entirety after everything said and determined in the conference, is, I believe, very improbable.  They would, therefore, be obliged to make some kind of a disposition, which could not differ very much in principle from what is being proposed now.  It might differ in geographical extent and in the degree of independence, but I do not believe that