his hold more quickly perhaps, though even this is doubtful.  Since banknotes are not legal tender at the Bank of England, it is not quite clear that the depositor would even have to take the trouble to go first to the Banking Department for notes and then to the Issue Department for gold.  He might be able to insist on gold in immediate payment of his deposit.  Still less convincing is the Committee’s argument that “the amalgamation of the two departments would inevitably lead in the end to State control of the creation of banking credit generally.”  Their report might have explained why this should be so, for to the ordinary mind the chain of consequence is not apparent.  On the whole it is hard to see much good or harm to be achieved by changing the form of the Bank return.  It might make the Bank’s position look stronger, but it could not make it really stronger.  Nor would it really impair the strength of the note-holder’s position as against the depositor, because even now there is no essential difference.  It would substitute a more businesslike and simple statement for a form of accounts which is cumbrous and stupid and Early Victorian—­a relic of an age which produced the crinoline, the Crystal Palace and the Albert Memorial.  On the other hand, to alter a statistical record merely for the sake of simplicity and symmetry is questionable.  Unless we are getting more and truer information, it is a pity to make comparisons between one year and another difficult by changing the form in which figures are given.

A more essential difference between the two policies lies in Sir Edward’s advocacy of a ratio—­three to one—­between notes and gold, and the Committee’s support of the old fixed line system.  By the latter, if gold comes in, notes to the same extent can be created, and if gold goes out notes to the amount of the export have to be cancelled.  Under Sir Edward’s policy the influx and efflux of gold would have an effect on the note issue which would be three times the amount of the gold that came in or went out.  This at least is the logical effect of his statement that “the notes should not exceed three times the gold or the cash balance.”  This law does not seem to be quite consistent with his view that the fixed ratio of gold to notes may be lowered by the payment of a tax; but presumably the tax would come into operation before the three to one part was reached, and at three to one there would be a firm line drawn.  On this assumption the Committee’s argument is a very strong one.  “If,” says its report (Cd. 9182, p. 8), “the actual note issue is really controlled by the proportion, the arrangement is liable to bring about very violent disturbances.  Suppose, for example, that the proportion of gold to notes is actually fixed at one-third and is operative.  Then, if the withdrawal of gold for export reduces the proportion below the prescribed limit, it is necessary to withdraw notes in the ratio of three to one.  Any approach