stopped forthwith, and that if it were necessary to
provide more currency it would be better for the banks
to be allowed to issue notes themselves. This
suggestion involves, of course, a complete reversal
of the principles on which our monetary system has
grown up, since it has long been based on a note-issuing
monopoly in the hands of the Bank of England.
But these are topsy-turvy days, in which greyheaded
precedent is very justly at a heavy discount; and
Mr Goodenough’s suggestion very practically gets
over a big difficulty that stands in the way of stopping
the stream of Bradburys. This difficulty lies
in the fact that if the banks were pulled at by their
customers for currency and could not supply them with
Bradbury notes, they would be forced to take notes
from the Bank of England, with a bad effect on the
appearance of its reserve. If the business of
issuing notes were put into the hands of the clearing
banks, their power to do so would be limited by the
extent of their assets, or of such of their assets
as were thought fit to rank as backing for their notes.
In other words, the note-issuing business would once
more have to be regulated on banking principles and
controlled by the price asked, for advances, instead
of expressing the helplessness and improvidence of
an impecunious and invertebrate Government. In
this manner the new departure might be a convenient
halfway-house on the way from chaos back to sanity.
But probably it is too revolutionary and goes too
straight in the teeth of the Bank of England’s
privilege to receive much practical consideration;
and there is the question whether the public would
take the new paper readily and whether it could be
made legal tender.
Sir Edward Holden, in one of those masterly surveys
of world finance with which he now instructs the shareholders
of the London Joint City and Midland Bank, assembled
at their annual meeting, gave much of his attention
to an attack on the report of Lord Cunliffe’s
Committee on Currency. This was only to be expected,
since the Committee had made recommendations on lines
which were largely conservative and did not embody
any of the reforms or changes which had been previously
advocated by Sir Edward. Being on this occasion
chiefly critical, he did not make very clear in his
latest speech the precise proposals that he favours.
For them we have to go back to his speech of a year
ago, as reported in the Economist of February
2, 1918, p. 171, where he stated that “if the
Bank (of England) had been working on the same principles
as other national banks of issue, there would have
been little ground for anxiety,” and that these
principles are:—
1. One bank of issue and not divided into departments.
2. Notes are created and issued on the security
of bills of exchange and on the cash balance, so that
a relation is established between the notes issued
and the discounts.
3. The notes issued are controlled by a fixed
ratio of gold to notes or of the cash balance to notes.