States and in particular would secure the avoidance of anything which might disturb Germany’s relations to foreign countries or interfere with the course of Germany’s foreign policy as carried on through the regular official channel, the Foreign Office.  The ground for this popular interpretation is a constitutional device which to an Englishman, if it be not offensive to say so, can only recall the well-known definition of a metaphysician as “a blind man, in a dark room, looking for a black cat, which is not there.”

The device is known as the Chancellor’s “responsibility,” which was regarded, and is still regarded in Germany, as at once “covering” the Emperor and offering to his folk a safeguard against unwisdom or caprice on his part.  The nature of this responsibility which is evidenced by the Chancellor signing the Emperor’s edicts and other official statements, is so frequently discussed by German politicians, the position of the Chancellor—­the Grand Vizier of Germany he has been picturesquely called—­is so influential, and the intercourse between the Emperor and the Chancellor is so close, exclusive, and confidential, that an examination of the meaning of the term “responsibility” in this connexion is desirable.

Whenever the Emperor does anything important or surprising, especially in foreign policy, the first question asked by his subjects is, has he taken the step with the knowledge, and therefore with the joint responsibility, of the Chancellor?  If the answer is in the negative, it is the “personal regiment” again, and people are angry:  if the latter, they may disapprove of the step and grumble at it, but it is covered by the Chancellor’s signature and they can raise no constitutional objection.  Hence the demand usually made on such occasions for an Act of Parliament once for all defining fully and clearly the Chancellor’s responsibilities.  According to Prince von Buelow, and it is doubtless the Emperor’s own view, the responsibility mentioned in the Constitution is a “moral responsibility,” and only refers to such acts and orders of the Emperor as immediately arise out of the governing rights vested in him, not to personal expressions of opinion, even though these may be made on formal occasions; and the Prince goes on to say that if a Chancellor cannot prevent what he honestly thinks would permanently and in an important respect be injurious to the Empire, he is bound to resign.

The Chancellor, then, takes responsibility of some kind.  But responsibility to whom?  To the Emperor?  To the Parliament?  To the people?  The answer is, solely to the Emperor, for it is the Emperor who appoints and dismisses him as well as every other Minister, imperial or Prussian, and the Emperor is only responsible to his conscience.  In parliamentarily ruled countries like England Ministers are responsible to Parliament, which expresses its disapproval by the vote of a hostile majority, or in certain circumstances by a vote of censure or even