[Footnote 2:  Similarity (sadrs’ya_) is not regarded as a separate category, for it is defined as identity in difference (tadbhinnatve sati tadgatabhuyodharmavattvam).]

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is on account of its presence that atoms appear as different to the yogins who can perceive them.

Samavaya, the inseparable relation of inherence, is a relation by virtue of which two different things such as substance and attribute, substance and karma, substance and samanya, karana (cause) and karya (effect), atoms and vis’e@sa, appear so unified that they represent one whole, or one identical inseparable reality.  This peculiar relation of inseparable inherence is the cause why substance, action, and attribute, cause and effect, and jati in substance and attribute appear as indissolubly connected as if they are one and the same thing Samyoga or contact may take place between two things of the same nature which exist as disconnected and may later on be connected (yutasiddha), such as when I put my pen on the table.  The pen and the table are both substances and were disconnected, the samynga relation is the gu@na by virtue of which they appear to be connected for a while.  Samavaya however makes absolutely difficient things such as dravya and gu@na and karma or karana and karya (clay and jug) appear as one inseparable whole (ayutasiddha).  This relation is thus a separate and independent category.  This is not regarded as many like sa@myogas (contact) but as one and eternal because it has no cause.  This or that object (eg. jug) may be destroyed but the samavaya relation which was never brought into being by anybody always remains [Footnote ref 1].

These six things are called the six padarthas or independent realities experienced in perception and expressed in language.

The Theory of Causation.

The Nyaya-Vais’e@sika in most of its speculations took that view of things which finds expression in our language, and which we tacitly assume as true in all our ordinary experience.  Thus

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[Footnote 1:  The Vedanta does not admit the existence of the relation of samavaya as subsisting between two different entities (e.g. substance and qualities).  Thus S’a@nkara says (Brahma-sutrabha@sya II. ii. 13) that if a samavaya relation is to be admitted to connect two different things, then another samavaya would be necessary to connect it with either of the two entities that it intended to connect, and that another, and so there will be a vicious infinite (anavastha).  Nyaya, however, would not regard it as vicious at all.  It is well to remember that the Indian systems acknowledge two kinds of anavastha—­prama@niki (valid infinite, as in case of the question of the seed and the tree, or of the avidya and the passions), and another aprama@niki anavastha (vicious infinite) as when the admission of anything invokes an infinite chain before it can be completed.]