I cannot close this chapter without mentioning the fact that so far as the logical portion of the Nyaya system is concerned, though Ak@sapada was the first to write a comprehensive account of it, the Jains and Buddhists in medieval times had independently worked at this subject and had criticized the Nyaya account of logic and made valuable contributions.  In Jaina logic Das’avaikalikaniryukti of Bhadrabahu (357 B.C.), Umasvati’s Tattvarthadhigama sutra, Nyayavatara of Siddhasena Divakara (533 A.D.) Ma@nikya Nandi’s (800 A.D.) Parik@samukha sutra, and Prama@nanayatattvalokala@mkara of Deva Suri (1159 A.D.) and Prameyakamalamarta@n@da of Prabhacandra deserve special notice. Prama@nasamuccaya and Nyayapraves’a of Di@nnaga (500 A.D.), Prama@nayarttika karika and Nyayabindu of Dharmakirtti (650 A.D.) with the commentary of Dharmottara are the most interesting of the Buddhist works on systematic logic [Footnote ref l].  The diverse points of difference between the Hindu, Jain and Buddhist logic require to be dealt with in a separate work on Indian logic and can hardly be treated within the compass of the present volume.

It is interesting to notice that between the Vatsyayana bha@sya and the Udyotakara’s Varttika no Hindu work on logic of importance seems to have been written:  it appears that the science of logic in this period was in the hands of the Jains and the Buddhists; and it was Di@nnaga’s criticism of Hindu Nyaya that roused Udyotakara to write the Varttika.  The Buddhist and the Jain method of treating logic separately from metaphysics as an independent study was not accepted by the Hindus till we come to Ga@nges’a, and there is probably only one Hindu work of importance on Nyaya in the Buddhist style namely Nyayasara of Bhasarvajna.  Other older Hindu works generally treated of

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[Footnote 1:  See Indian Logic Medieval School, by Dr S.C.  Vidyabhu@sa@na, for a bibliography of Jain and Buddhist Logic.]

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inference only along with metaphysical and other points of Nyaya interest [Footnote ref 1].

The main doctrine of the Nyaya-Vais’e@sika Philosophy [Footnote ref 2].

The Nyaya-Vais’e@sika having dismissed the doctrine of momentariness took a common-sense view of things, and held that things remain permanent until suitable collocations so arrange themselves that the thing can be destroyed.  Thus the jug continues to remain a jug unless or until it is broken to pieces by the stroke of a stick.  Things exist not because they can produce an impression on us, or serve my purposes either directly or through knowledge, as the Buddhists suppose, but because existence is one of their characteristics.  If I or you or any other perceiver did not exist, the things would continue to exist all the same.  Whether they produce any effect on us or on their surrounding environments is immaterial.  Existence is the most general characteristic of things, and it is on account of this that things are testified by experience to be existing.