Works according to the injunctions of the scriptures since they have no visible effect are the cause of prosperity, and because the Vedas direct them, they have validity.

Philosophy in the Nyaya sutras [Footnote ref 1].

The Nyaya sutras begin with an enumeration of the sixteen subjects, viz. means of right knowledge (prama@na), object of right knowledge (prameya), doubt (sa@ms’aya), purpose (prayojana), illustrative instances (d@r@s@tanta), accepted conclusions (siddhanta), premisses (avayava), argumentation (tarka), ascertainment (nir@naya), debates (vada), disputations (jalpa), destructive criticisms (vita@n@da), fallacy (hetvabhasa), quibble (chala), refutations (jati), points of opponent’s defeat (nigrahasthana), and hold that by a thorough knowledge of these the highest good (nihs’reyasa), is attained.  In the second sutra it is said that salvation (apavarga) is attained by the successive disappearance of false knowledge (mithyajnana), defects (do@sa), endeavours (prav@rtti, birth (janma), and ultimately of sorrow.  Then the means of proof are said to be of four kinds, perception (pratyak@sa), inference (anumana), analogy (upamana), and testimony (s’abda).  Perception is defined as uncontradicted determinate knowledge unassociated with names proceeding out of sense contact with objects.  Inference is of three kinds, from cause to effect (purvavat), effect to cause (s’e@savat), and inference from common characteristics (samanyato d@r@s@ta).  Upamana is the knowing of anything by similarity with any well-known thing.

S’abda is defined as the testimony of reliable authority (apta) [Footnote ref 2].

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[Footnote 1:  This is a brief summary of the doctrines found in Nyaya sutras, supplemented here and there with the views of Vatsyayana, the commentator.  This follows the order of the sutras, and tries to present their ideas with as little additions from those of later day Nyaya as possible.  The general treatment of Nyaya-Vais’e@sika expounds the two systems in the light of later writers and commentators.]

[Footnote 2:  It is curious to notice that Vatsyayana says that an arya, a @r@si or a mleccha (foreigner), may be an apta (reliable authority).]

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Such a testimony may tell us about things which may be experienced and which are beyond experience.  Objects of knowledge are said to be self (atman), body, senses, sense-objects, understanding (buddhi), mind (manas}, endeavour (prav@rtti), rebirths, enjoyment of pleasure and suffering of pain, sorrow and salvation.  Desire, antipathy, effort (prayatna), pleasure, pain, and knowledge indicate the existence