that, if he asserted the right and duty of forcible coercion, he would find at his back the indispensable force, moral and physical, of the people.  Demoralization at the North was widespread.  After the lapse of a few months this condition passed, and then those who had been beneath its influence desired to forget the humiliating fact, and hoped that others might either forget or never know the measure of their weakness.  In order that they might save their good names, it was natural that they should seek to suppress all evidence which had not already found its way upon the public record; but enough remains to show how grievously for a while the knees were weakened under many who enjoy—­and rightfully, by reason of the rest of their lives—­the reputation of stalwart patriots.  For example, late in October, General Scott suggested to the President a division of the country into four separate confederacies, roughly outlining their boundaries.  Scott was a dull man, but he was the head of the army and enjoyed a certain prestige, so that it was impossible to say that his notions, however foolish in themselves, were of no consequence.  But if the blunders of General Scott could not fatally wound the Union cause, the blunders of Horace Greeley might conceivably do so.  If there had been in the Northern States any newspaper—­apart from Mr. Garrison’s “Liberator”—­which was thoroughly committed to the anti-slavery cause, it was the New York “Tribune,” under the guidance of that distinguished editor.  Republicans everywhere throughout the land had been educated by his teachings, and had become accustomed to take a large part of their knowledge and their opinions in matters political from his writings.  It was a misfortune for Abraham Lincoln, which cannot be overrated, that from the moment of his nomination to the day of his death the “Tribune” was largely engaged in criticising his measures and in condemning his policy.

No sooner did all that, which Mr. Greeley had been striving during many years to bring about, seem to be on the point of consummation, than the demoralized and panic-stricken reformer became desirous to undo his own achievements, and to use for the purpose of effecting a sudden retrogression all the influence which he had gained by bold leadership.  November 9, 1860, it was appalling to read in the editorial columns of his sheet, that “if the Cotton States shall decide that they can do better out of the Union than in it, we insist on letting them go in peace;” that, while the “Tribune” denied the right of nullification, yet it would admit that “to withdraw from the Union is quite another matter;” that “whenever a considerable section of our Union shall deliberately resolve to go out, we shall resist all coercive measures designed to keep it in."[117] At the end of another month the “Tribune’s” famous editor was still in the same frame of mind, declaring himself “averse to the employment of military force to fasten one section of our confederacy