it is cheering to find that no effort has to be made to forget anything about the President.  In his case injurious gossip has long since died away and been buried.  Whatever may be said of him in other respects, at least the purity and the singleness of his patriotism shine brilliant and luminous through all this cloud-dust of derogation.  By his position he had more at stake, both in his lifetime and before the tribunal of the future, than any other person in the country.  But there was only one idea in his mind, and that was,—­not that he should save the country, but that the country should be saved.  Not the faintest shadow of self ever fell for an instant across this simple purpose.  He was intent to play his part out faithfully, with all the ability he could bring to it; but any one else, who could, might win and wear the title of savior.  He chiefly cared that the saving should be done.  Never once did he manipulate any covert magnet to draw toward himself the credit or the glory of a measure or a move.  To his own future he seemed to give no thought.  It would be unjust to allow the dread of appearing to utter eulogy rather than historic truth to betray a biographer into overlooking this genuine magnanimity.

* * * * *

It was in December, 1861, that Congress created the famous Committee on the Conduct of the War, to some of whose doings it has already been necessary to allude.  The gentlemen who were placed upon it were selected partly of course for political reasons, and were all men who had made themselves conspicuous for their enthusiasm and vehemence; not one of them had any military knowledge.  The committee magnified its office almost beyond limit,—­investigated everything; haled whom it chose to testify before it; made reports, expressed opinions, insisted upon policies and measures in matters military; and all with a dictatorial assumption and self-confidence which could not be devoid of effect, although every one knew that each individual member was absolutely without fitness for this business.  So the committee made itself a great power, and therefore also a great complication, in the war machinery; and though it was sometimes useful, yet, upon a final balancing of its long account, it failed to justify its existence, as, indeed, was to have been expected from the outset.[155] In the present discussions concerning an advance of the army, its members strenuously insisted upon immediate action, and their official influence brought much strength to that side.

The first act indicating an intention on the part of the President to interfere occurred almost simultaneously with the beginning of the general’s illness.  About December 21, 1861, he handed to McClellan a brief memorandum:  “If it were determined to make a forward movement of the army of the Potomac, without awaiting further increase of numbers or better drill and discipline, how long would it require to