on the part of the stronger section to obtain the permanent control; and on the part of the weaker, to preserve its independence and equality as members of the Union.  The conflict will thus become one between the States occupying the different sections,—­that is, between organized bodies on both sides,—­each, in the event of separation, having the means of avoiding the confusion and anarchy to which the parts would be subject without such organization.  This would contribute much to increase the power of resistance on the part of the weaker section against the stronger in possession of the government.  With these great advantages and resources, it is hardly possible that the parties occupying the weaker section would consent quietly, under any circumstances, to break down from independent and equal sovereignties into a dependent and colonial condition; and still less so, under circumstances that would revolutionize them internally, and put their very existence as a people at stake.  Never was there an issue between independent States that involved greater calamity to the conquered, than is involved in that between the States which compose the two sections of the Union.  The condition of the weaker, should it sink from a state of independence and equality to one of dependence and subjection, would be more calamitous than ever before befell a civilized people.  It is vain to think that, with such consequences before them, they will not resist; especially, when resistance may save them, and cannot render their condition worse.  That this will take place, unless the stronger section desists from its course, may be assumed as certain; and that, if forced to resist, the weaker section would prove successful, and the system end in disunion, is, to say the least, highly probable.  But if it should fail, the great increase of power and patronage which must, in consequence, accrue to the government of the United States, would but render certain and hasten the termination in the other alternative.  So that, at all events, to the one or to the other—­to monarchy or disunion—­it must come, if not prevented by strenuous or timely efforts.”

This is a very instructive passage, and one that shows well the complexity of human motives.  Mr. Calhoun betrays the secret that, after all, the contest between the two sections is a “contest for the honors and emoluments of the government,” and that all the rest is but pretext and afterthought,—­as General Jackson said it was.  He plainly states that the policy of the South is rule or ruin.  Besides this, he intimates that there is in the United States an “interest,” an institution, the development of which is incompatible with the advancement of the general interest; and either that one interest must overshadow and subdue all other interests, or all other interests must unite to crush that one.  The latter has been done.