But though the loyal people of the country are more than willing—­are ardently desirous—­to be taxed for the public service, they are not willing to be taxed for the benefit of fraudulent contractors, or to enrich the miscreants who, not content with plundering the Treasury by exorbitant prices, put the health and lives of our brave men in peril, and the success of the war at hazard, by furnishing arms that have been condemned as unserviceable, clothes and shoes that drop to pieces in a fortnight’s wear, water poisoned by filthy casks, horses too feeble to be ridden, and vessels known by their vendors to be of a draught too great for the intended service.  It is not unlikely that there may be exaggeration in the accounts of this kind that find their way into the public journals; but if any reliance can be placed on the reports of our legislative committees, frauds like those alluded to have been carried to a stupendous length.  If we mistake not, a bill has been introduced into Congress for the condign punishment of the wretches guilty of these abominable crimes.  The offences which have filled Forts Lafayette and Warren with their inmates are venial, compared with the guilt of the man who is willing to fatten on the sufferings of the country and the health and lives of its patriotic defenders.  But the evil, enormous as it is, admits of an easy remedy.  If, on the one hand, one or two cases of gross fraud, highly prejudicial to the public service, were summarily dealt with by a court-martial, while, on the other hand, fifty per cent, of the contract-price were habitually retained for three or four months, till the value of the article furnished was ascertained by trial, the evil would soon be brought within manageable limits.  A little of the wholesome severity with which Bonaparte, in 1797, carried on what he called “la guerre aux voleurs"[B] would not only save millions to the Treasury of the United States, but protect the country from consequences still more disastrous.

    [Footnote B:  Thiers, Tome II., p. 337.]

In fact, it will be one of the incidental benefits of an efficient system of taxation, that it will induce greater care in the expenditure of the public money.  Fraudulent contracts are not the only, nor even the chief cause of our financial embarrassments.  It may be hoped that what is extracted from it by downright swindling, however considerable in amount, does not cause the great drain upon the Treasury.  But if money can be obtained by the simple issue of evidences of debt, and without any provision to sustain the credit of the Government by taxation, the process of supply is too facile.  The funds so easily procured are in danger of being too profusely spent.  Individual responsibility in money-matters, aided by direct self-interest, is usually more efficient in imposing limits to improvidence than a general sense of duty on the part of official personages.  But if funds could be obtained ad libitum by the speculator, without the necessity of giving security for the payment of principal or interest, bankruptcy would soon become the rule and solvency the exception.  Still more urgently, in the administration of the National Treasury, is the wholesome corrective of taxation required, to make economy a necessity as well as a virtue.