There are, in this case, all the essential constituent parts of a contract.  There is something to be contracted about, there are parties, and there are plain terms in which the agreement of the parties on the subject of the contract is expressed.  There are mutual considerations and inducements.  The charter recites, that the founder, on his part, has agreed to establish his seminary in New Hampshire, and to enlarge it beyond its original design, among other things, for the benefit of that Province; and thereupon a charter is given to him and his associates, designated by himself, promising and assuring to them, under the plighted faith of the State, the right of governing the college and administering its concerns in the manner provided in the charter.  There is a complete and perfect grant to them of all the power of superintendence, visitation, and government.  Is not this a contract?  If lands or money had been granted to him and his associates, for the same purposes, such grant could not be rescinded.  And is there any difference, in legal contemplation, between a grant of corporate franchises and a grant of tangible property?  No such difference is recognized in any decided case, nor does it exist in the common apprehension of mankind.

It is therefore contended, that this case falls within the true meaning of this provision of the Constitution, as expounded in the decisions of this court; that the charter of 1769 is a contract, a stipulation or agreement, mutual in its considerations, express and formal in its terms, and of a most binding and solemn nature.  That the acts in question impair this contract, has already been sufficiently shown.  They repeal and abrogate its most essential parts.

A single observation may not be improper on the opinion of the court of New Hampshire, which has been published.  The learned judges who delivered that opinion have viewed this question in a very different light from that in which the plaintiffs have endeavored to exhibit it.  After some general remarks, they assume that this college is a public corporation; and on this basis their judgment rests.  Whether all colleges are not regarded as private and eleemosynary corporations, by all law writers and all judicial decisions; whether this college was not founded by Dr. Wheelock; whether the charter was not granted at his request, the better to execute a trust, which he had already created; whether he and his associates did not become visitors, by the charter; and whether Dartmouth College be not, therefore, in the strictest sense, a private charity, are questions which the learned judges do not appear to have discussed.

It is admitted in that opinion, that, if it be a private corporation, its rights stand on the same ground as those of an individual.  The great question, therefore, to be decided is, To which class of corporations do colleges thus founded belong?  And the plaintiffs have endeavored to satisfy the court, that, according to the well-settled principles and uniform decisions of law, they are private, eleemosynary corporations.