powers, duration, or responsibility of office.  I agree, that Congress ought not to do any thing which shall essentially impair that right of nomination and appointment of certain officers, such as ministers, judges, &c., which the Constitution has vested in the President and Senate.  But while the power of nomination and appointment is left fairly where the Constitution has placed it, I think the whole field of regulation is open to legislative discretion.  If a law were to pass, declaring that district attorneys, or collectors of customs, should hold their offices four years, unless removed on conviction for misbehavior, no one could doubt its constitutional validity; because the legislature is naturally competent to prescribe the tenure of office.  And is a reasonable check on the power of removal any thing more than a qualification of the tenure of office?  Let it be always remembered, that the President’s removing power, as now exercised, is claimed and held under the general clause vesting in him the executive authority.  It is implied, or inferred, from that clause alone.

Now, if it is properly derived from that source, since the Constitution does not say how it shall be limited, how defined, or how carried into effect, it seems especially proper for Congress, under the general provision of the Constitution which gives it authority to pass all laws necessary to carry into effect the powers conferred on any department, to regulate the subject of removal.  And the regulation here required is of the gentlest kind.  It only provides that the President shall make known to the Senate his reasons for removal of officers of this description, when he does see fit to remove them.  It might, I think, very justly go farther.  It might, and perhaps it ought, to prescribe the form of removal, and the proof of the fact.  It might, I also think, declare that the President should only suspend officers, at pleasure, till the next meeting of the Senate, according to the amendment suggested by the honorable member from Kentucky; and, if the present practice cannot be otherwise checked, this provision, in my opinion, ought hereafter to be adopted.  But I am content with the slightest degree of restraint which may be sufficient to arrest the totally unnecessary, unreasonable, and dangerous exercise of the power of removal.  I desire only, for the present at least, that, when the President turns a man out of office, he should give his reasons for it to the Senate, when he nominates another person to fill the place.  Let him give these reasons, and stand on them.  If they are fair and honest, he need have no fear in stating them.  It is not to invite any trial; it is not to give the removed officer an opportunity of defence; it is not to excite controversy and debate; it is simply that the Senate, and ultimately the public, may know the grounds of removal.  I deem this degree of regulation, at least, necessary; unless we are willing to submit all these officers to an absolute and a perfectly irresponsible removing power; a power which, as recently exercised, tends to turn the whole body of public officers into partisans, dependants, favorites, sycophants, and man-worshippers.