certain powers; and whether it be one of those powers, that it shall construe and interpret for itself the terms of the compact, in doubtful cases, is a question which can only be decided by looking to the compact, and inquiring what provisions it contains on this point.  Without any inconsistency with natural reason, the government even thus created might be trusted with this power of construction.  The extent of its powers, therefore, must still be sought for in the instrument itself.

If the old Confederation had contained a clause, declaring that resolutions of the Congress should be the supreme law of the land, any State law or constitution to the contrary notwithstanding, and that a committee of Congress, or any other body created by it, should possess judicial powers, extending to all cases arising under resolutions of Congress, then the power of ultimate decision would have been vested in Congress under the Confederation, although that Confederation was a compact between States; and for this plain reason,—­that it would have been competent to the States, who alone were parties to the compact, to agree who should decide in cases of dispute arising on the construction of the compact.

For the same reason, Sir, if I were now to concede to the gentleman his principal proposition, namely, that the Constitution is a compact between States, the question would still be, What provision is made, in this compact, to settle points of disputed construction, or contested power, that shall come into controversy?  And this question would still be answered, and conclusively answered, by the Constitution itself.

While the gentleman is contending against construction, he himself is setting up the most loose and dangerous construction.  The Constitution declares, that the laws of Congress passed in pursuance of the Constitution shall be the supreme law of the land.  No construction is necessary here.  It declares, also, with equal plainness and precision, that the judicial power of the United States shall extend to every case arising under the laws of Congress.  This needs no construction.  Here is a law, then, which is declared to be supreme; and here is a power established, which is to interpret that law.  Now, Sir, how has the gentleman met this?  Suppose the Constitution to be a compact, yet here are its terms; and how does the gentleman get rid of them?  He cannot argue the seal off the bond, nor the words out of the instrument.  Here they are; what answer does he give to them?  None in the world, Sir, except, that the effect of this would be to place the States in a condition of inferiority; and that it results from the very nature of things, there being no superior, that the parties must be their own judges!  Thus closely and cogently does the honorable gentleman reason on the words of the Constitution.  The gentleman says, if there be such a power of final decision in the general government, he asks for the grant of that power.  Well, Sir, I show him the grant.  I turn him to the very words.  I show him that the laws of Congress are made supreme; and that the judicial power extends, by express words, to the interpretation of these laws.  Instead of answering this, he retreats into the general reflection, that it must result from the nature of things, that the States, being parties, must judge for themselves.