and remonstrance, or by proposing to the people an alteration of the Federal Constitution.  This would all be quite unobjectionable.  Or it may be that no more is meant than to assert the general right of revolution, as against all governments, in cases of intolerable oppression.  This no one doubts, and this, in my opinion, is all that he who framed the resolutions could have meant by it; for I shall not readily believe that he was ever of opinion that a State, under the Constitution and in conformity with it, could, upon the ground of her own opinion of its unconstitutionality, however clear and palpable she might think the case, annul a law of Congress, so far as it should operate on herself by her own legislative power.

I must now beg to ask, Sir, Whence is this supposed right of the States derived?  Where do they find the power to interfere with the laws of the Union?  Sir, the opinion which the honorable gentleman maintains is a notion founded in a total misapprehension, in my judgment, of the origin of this government, and of the foundation on which it stands.  I hold it to be a popular government, erected by the people; those who administer it, responsible to the people; and itself capable of being amended and modified, just as the people may choose it should be.  It is as popular, just as truly emanating from the people, as the State governments.  It is created for one purpose; the State governments for another.  It has its own powers; they have theirs.  There is no more authority with them to arrest the operation of a law of Congress, than with Congress to arrest the operation of their laws.  We are here to administer a Constitution emanating immediately from the people, and trusted by them to our administration.  It is not the creature of the State governments.  It is of no moment to the argument, that certain acts of the State legislatures are necessary to fill our seats in this body.  That is not one of their original State powers, a part of the sovereignty of the State.  It is a duty which the people, by the Constitution itself, have imposed on the State legislatures; and which they might have left to be performed elsewhere, if they had seen fit.  So they have left the choice of President with electors; but all this does not affect the proposition that this whole government, President, Senate, and House of Representatives, is a popular government.  It leaves it still all its popular character.  The governor of a State (in some of the States) is chosen, not directly by the people, but by those who are chosen by the people, for the purpose of performing, among other duties, that of electing a governor.  Is the government of the State, on that account, not a popular government?  This government, Sir, is the independent offspring of the popular will.  It is not the creature of State legislatures; nay, more, if the whole truth must be told, the people brought it into existence, established it, and have hitherto supported it, for the very purpose, amongst others, of imposing certain salutary restraints on State sovereignties.  The States cannot now make war; they cannot contract alliances; they cannot make, each for itself, separate regulations of commerce; they cannot lay imposts; they cannot coin money.  If this Constitution, Sir, be the creature of State legislatures, it must be admitted that it has obtained a strange control over the volitions of its creators.