Pleiae, and while the sentinels were fast asleep, as being in no immediate apprehension, he set fire to the huts in every part of the camp.  Great numbers perished in the flames before they could discover the enemy’s arrival, and those who did discover it could give no assistance; so that nearly the whole was destroyed by fire and sword.  From both these means of destruction, however, a very small number made their escape, and fled to the principal camp before Gythium.  The enemy having been thus smitten with disaster, Philopoemen forthwith led on his forces to ravage the district of Tripolis, a part of the Lacedaemonian territory, lying next to the frontiers of the Megalopolitans, and carrying off thence a vast number of men and cattle, withdrew before the tyrant could send a force from Gythium to protect the country.  He then collected his whole force at Tegea, to which place he summoned a council of the Achaeans and their allies; at which were present, also deputies from the Epirots and Acarnanians.  Here it was resolved, that as the minds of his men were now sufficiently recovered from the shame of the disgrace suffered at sea, and those of the enemy dispirited, he should march directly to Lacedaemon; for he considered that by this measure alone could the enemy be drawn off from the siege of Gythium.  On entering the enemy’s country, he encamped the first day at Caryae; and, on that very day, Gythium was taken.  Ignorant of that event, Philopoemen advanced to the Barbosthenes, a mountain ten miles from Lacedaemon.  On the other side, Nabis, after taking possession of Gythium, set out, at the head of a body of light troops, marched hastily by Lacedaemon, and seized on a place called the Camp of Pyrrhus, which post he did not doubt that the Achaeans intended to occupy.  From thence he proceeded to meet the enemy.  From the length of their train in consequence of the narrowness of the road, they spread over a space of almost five miles.  The line was closed by the cavalry and the greatest part of the auxiliaries, because Philopoemen expected that the tyrant would attack him in the rear with his mercenary troops, in whom he placed his principal confidence.  Two unforeseen circumstances at once filled him with uneasiness:  one, the post at which he aimed being pre-occupied; the other, the enemy having met him in front, where, as the road lay through very uneven ground, he did not see how the battalions could advance without the support of the light troops.

28.  Philopoemen was possessed of an admirable degree of skill and experience, in conducting a march, and choosing his station; having made these points his principal study, not only in times of war, but likewise during peace.  Whenever he was making a journey to any place and came to a defile where the passage was difficult, it was his practice, first, to examine the nature of the ground on every side.  When journeying alone, he meditated within himself; if he had company, he asked them, “If an enemy