59.  When Hegesianax hesitated, and could not deny, that the cause of liberty carried a more honourable semblance than that of slavery, Publius Sulpicius, who was the eldest of the ten ambassadors, said,—­“Let us cut the matter short.  Choose one of the two conditions clearly propounded just now by Quinctius; or deem it superfluous to negotiate about an alliance.”  But Menippus replied, “We neither will, nor can, accede to any proposition by which the dominions of Antiochus would be diminished.”  Next day, Quinctius brought into the senate-house all the ambassadors of Greece and Asia, in order that they might learn the dispositions entertained by the Roman people, and by Antiochus, towards the Grecian states.  He then acquainted them with his own demands, and those of the king; and desired them to “assure their respective states, that the same disinterested zeal and courage, which the Roman people had displayed in defence of their liberty against the encroachments of Philip, they would, likewise, exert against those of Antiochus, if he should refuse to retire out of Europe.”  On this, Menippus earnestly besought Quinctius and the senate, “not to be hasty in forming their determination, which, in its effects, might disturb the peace of the whole world; to take time to themselves, and allow the king time for consideration; that, when informed of the conditions proposed, he would consider them, and either obtain some relaxation in the terms, or accede to them for the sake of peace.”  Accordingly, the business was deferred entire; and a resolution passed, that the same ambassadors should be sent to the king who had attended him at Lysimachia,—­Publius Sulpicius, Publius Villius, and Publius Aelius.

60.  Scarcely had these begun their journey, when ambassadors from Carthage brought information, that Antiochus was evidently preparing for war, and that Hannibal was employed in his service; which gave reason to fear, that a Punic war might break out at the same time.  Hannibal, on leaving his own country, had gone to Antiochus, as was mentioned before, and was held by the king in high estimation, not so much for his other qualifications, as because, to a person who had long been revolving schemes for a war with Rome, there could not be any fitter participator of his counsels on such a subject.  His opinion was always one and the same, that the war should be carried on in Italy:  because “Italy would supply a foreign enemy both with men and provisions; but, if it were left in quiet, and the Roman people were allowed to employ the strength and forces of Italy, in making war beyond the limits of that country, no king or nation would be able to cope with them.”  He demanded, for himself, one hundred decked ships, ten thousand foot, and one thousand horse.  “With this force,” he said, “he would first repair to Africa; and he had confident hopes, that he should be able to prevail on the Carthaginians to revive hostilities.  If they should hesitate, he would raise a war against the Romans in some part of Italy.  That the king ought to cross over into Europe with all the rest of his force, and keep his army in some part of Greece; not to pass over immediately into Italy, but to be in readiness to do so; which would sufficiently conduce to the imposing character and the reported magnitude of the war.”