it is said that “two great divergent forms of moral goodness exist.”  The fight for moral goodness is ’under two flags’—­self-assertion and self-sacrifice.  And the allies “seem hostile to one another,” “at least in some respects and with some persons."[2] We have here the time-honoured opposition of egoism and altruism, with a difference.  Mr Bradley’s most notable adherent in the region of ethical enquiry prefers to overlook the difference and to return to the older opposition of conflicting ideals.[3] But Mr Bradley himself declines to rate the social factor in conduct so high.  It is not altruism or social activity which is the opponent of self-assertion or egoism, but self-sacrifice; and both self-assertion and self-sacrifice are kinds of self-realisation:  in the former the self seeks its realisation by perfecting its harmony; in the latter, by increasing its extent.  It is not in content that the two modes of self-realisation differ:  social factors, for instance, may enter into both; it is in the diverse uses made of the contents:[4] ‘system’ is aimed at in the one; ‘width’ in the other.[5] The harmony of these two methods is attained only when both morality and the individual self are “transcended and submerged."[6]

[Footnote 1:  Appearance and Reality, p. 410.]

[Footnote 2:  Appearance and Reality, p. 415.]

[Footnote 3:  Taylor, Problem of Conduct, p. 179 ff.]

[Footnote 4:  Appearance and Reality, p. 416.]

[Footnote 5:  Ibid., p. 414.]

[Footnote 6:  Ibid., p. 419.]

This discrepancy of aim, and then coming together of the hostile factors only in the annulling and disappearance of both, is a process quite in accordance with the general dialectic of Mr Bradley.  But two things may be noted with regard to it.  In the first place the effort after system is called self-assertion, and the effort after width or expansion is called self-sacrifice.  Perhaps the author may claim a right to give what names he likes to the processes he describes.  But in this case the names have a recognised meaning in the literature of morals, and no hint is given that they are used here in any meaning other than the ordinary.  And surely the term ‘self-sacrifice’ is an inappropriate term for describing the conduct which seeks expansion by multiplying the objects of desire—­by the pursuit of whatever offers a chance of widened interests, whether social or intellectual, aesthetic or sensual,—­even although “my individuality suffers loss” thereby, and “the health and harmony of my self is injured."[1] Loss may be the result; but aggrandisement is what is sought, though the effort fails through lack of organisation or system.  And again ‘self’ is not the only possible centre for the systematisation of conduct.  System in conduct may be realised in other ways than as self-assertion.  It is sought as truly by the man of science who gives up everything for the pursuit of truth or by the philanthropist who forgets himself in promoting the social welfare.  Such modes of life as these—­and not merely self-assertive conduct—­may become centres of a moral activity which aims at system.