[Footnote 3:  Holland, Manual of Naval Prize Law (1888), p. 24.]

France in 1885 declared rice to be contraband when shipped from the southern to the northern ports of China, with whom she was at war.  But in declaring that all cargoes so shipped were to be considered as contraband the French Government made a distinction as to their intended or probable destination and use.  Great Britain protested at that time, but as no cases came before French prize courts we have no way of judging of the French declaration and its value as a precedent.  But the majority of the authorities upon the principles of international law admit that foodstuffs which are destined for the use of the enemy’s army or navy may be declared contraband in character.  The practice of the United States, of Great Britain and of Japan has been to follow this rule.  Russia in 1904 declared rice and provisions in general to be contraband.  When Great Britain and the United States protested against this decision the Russian Government altered its declaration so far as to include foodstuffs as conditional contraband only.  Germany has held that articles which may serve at the same time in war and peace are reputed contraband if their destination for the military or naval operations of the enemy is shown by the circumstances.

All authorities seem to agree that contraband to be treated as such must be captured in the course of direct transit to the belligerent, but the difficulty nearly always arises as to what shall be considered direct transit.  One rule has been that the shipment is confiscable if bound for a hostile port, another that it is only necessary to show that the ultimate destination of the goods is hostile.  The latter rule was declared to apply in the American case of the Springbok, an English merchantman conveying goods in 1863 from a neutral port to a neutral port, but, it was alleged, with the evident intention that the goods should reach by a later stage of the same voyage the belligerent forces of the Southern Confederacy, then at war with the United States.[4] In this case, however, the conclusive presumption was that the character of the goods themselves left no doubt possible as to their ultimate destination.  The guilt of the vessel was not based upon the ground of carrying contraband but upon a presumption that the blockade established over the Southern States was to have been broken.  Both the ship and its cargo were condemned by the district court of southern New York, but the cargo alone was later considered liable to condemnation by the Supreme Court of the United States.  Great Britain at the time noted an exception to the decision, but refused to take up claims on the part of the English owners against the United States Government for indemnity.  Earl Russell, in refusing the request of the owners for intervention by Great Britain, said in part:  “A careful perusal ... of the judgment, containing the reasons of the judge, the authorities cited by