[Footnote 50:  Art. 4 of Japanese proclamation of neutrality, May 2, 1898.  For.  Rel., 1898, p. 879.]

The Netherlands proclamation warned all Dutch subjects under penalty against exporting “arms, ammunition, or other war materials to the parties at war [to include] everything that is adaptable for immediate use in war."[51]

[Footnote 51:  Art II (b) of Netherlands proclamation of neutrality.  May 3, 1898.  For.  Rel., 1898, p. 888.]

Although the primary object of these prohibitions was the stoppage of all dealings in articles of a contraband nature, when fairly construed in the light of international opinion they would seem to render illegal the wholesale dealing in horses and mules intended for army purposes by one of the belligerents.  Such animals are undoubtedly “adaptable for immediate use in war” and were in fact a necessity for the successful carrying on of the war.  In the light of the express restrictions of the Treaty of Washington as exemplified in the war between one of the parties to that treaty and a third party in 1898, the obligation imposed upon the United States, impliedly at any rate, by the sixth article of the mutual agreement of 1871 might be read:  “The United States is bound not to permit Great Britain to make use of its ports or waters as the base of naval operations against the South African Republics, or for the purpose of the renewal or augmentation of military supplies.”

It would seem obvious that horses and mules when intended for immediate use in military operations are within the meaning of the term “military supplies.”  In numbers of instances horses have been considered contraband of war.  The treaty of 1778 between the United States and France declared:  “Horses with their furnishings are contraband of war,"[52] In the treaty of December 1, 1774, between Holland and Great Britain it was understood that “Horses and other warlike instruments are contraband of war.”  And Hall declares that horses are generally considered contraband and are so mentioned in the treaties between different States.  He points out that the placing of an army on a war footing often exhausts the whole horse reserve of a country and subsequent losses must be supplied from abroad; the necessity for this is in proportion to the magnitude of the armies.  Every imported horse is probably bought on account of the Government, and if it is not some other horse is at least set free for belligerent use.  “Under the mere light of common sense,” he says, “the possibility of looking upon horses as contraband seems hardly open to argument."[53]

[Footnote 52:  Article XXIV; Wharton, Digest of Int.  Law (1886), Vol.  III, Sec.372.]

[Footnote 53:  International Law (1880), pp. 579-580.]

Oppenheim shows that the importance of horses and beasts of burden for cavalry, artillery, and military transport sufficiently explains their being declared contraband by belligerents.  He asserts that no argument against their being held as conditional contraband has any validity, and it is admitted that they are frequently declared absolute contraband.[54] During the Russo-Japanese War Russia at first refused to recognize any distinction between conditional and absolute contraband, but later altered her decision with the exception of “horses and beasts of burden,” which she treated as absolute contraband.