trenches and ambuscades by storm.  The incapacity of the Spaniards to put down the Cuban Rebellion caused grave misapprehensions, both as to the Spanish and Cuban soldiery, for few Americans understand the conditions of the interminable guerilla warfare, the particular military accomplishment of the Spanish race, impotent in all save the destructive effect upon those not engaged in it.  In Congress no impression could be made of the real feebleness of the Cubans, except in bushwhacking, and it is still a puzzle that the immense masses of Spanish troops should be so helpless against the insurgents, and yet so troublesome in harassing invaders.  The Cuban army was not a myth, certainly, but it has been a disappointment to those who were swift in shouting its praises, upon information given by the Cuban Key West Bureau of News novelettes.  It was well that the attack on Spain in the West Indies was directed upon Santiago and Porto Rico.  The former manifestly was a point that commanded the central waters of the West Indies; recently there have been expressions of surprise that the expedition to Porto Rico, finally and handsomely led by Major General Miles, commanding the army of the United States, was so delayed.  Investigation from the inside will duly determine that no harm was done in that case by loss of time.  Santiago was pointed out by many circumstances as the vital spot of Spanish power in America, where a mortal blow might be delivered.  It was in the province where the insurgents had greater strength than in any other part of the island.  It was so situated that our fleet in that locality was close to the Windward Passage, east of Cuba, where Columbus was at once perplexed and triumphant, and to Hayti, Jamaica and Porto Rico; and there were several landings where it would be possible to disembark troops, protected by the fire of our ships.  More than that, Santiago is the old capital of Cuba, the place where the head of the Cuban church abides, and the scene of the Virginius Massacre—­altogether having a place in history almost equal to that of Havana.  It was not doubted the sanitary situation of the east end of Cuba was better than that of the west end.  Experience shows that this easy assumption was questionable.  If we omit the great plague spot, the city of Havana, it will appear that Santiago is in a region as pestilential as can be found in the provinces of Havana and Pinar del Rio.  More than all other associations and conspicuities, the attention of the world was directed to Santiago because Cervera’s elusive fleet, short of coal and provisions, and overmatched by the United States navy, took refuge in the deep harbor, hoping to clean his ships, get supplies and escape with coal enough to open a new career.  The Spaniards were too slow, and the only ships of Spain that showed a sign of the spirit of enterprise and the capacity of adventure, were bottled up by a relentless blockade.  Lieutenant Hobson became famous in a night in his most hazardous effort to use the Merrimac as a cork for the bottle, but fortunately left a gap through which the Spaniards made haste to their doom.  When the second fleet of Spain was destroyed, all chance of disputing our supremacy at sea, or of doing anything to guard Spanish interests either in the East or West Indies, was extinguished.