McClellan had in front of him the lines of Richmond, and his advance had been delayed by the rising of the Chickahominy.  He had fought a hard fight at Seven Pines; and the constant interference of Jackson had kept him waiting for McDowell.  But, at the same time, he had displayed an excess of caution which was perfectly apparent to his astute opponent.  He had made no attempt to use his superior numbers; and Lee had come to the conclusion that the attack on Richmond would take the same form as the attack on Yorktown,—­the establishment of great batteries, the massing of heavy ordnance, and all the tedious processes of a siege.  He read McClellan like an open book.  He had personal knowledge both of his capacity and character, for they had served together on the same staff in the Mexican war.  He knew that his young adversary was a man of undoubted ability, of fascinating address, and of courage that was never higher than when things were at their worst.  But these useful qualities were accompanied by marked defects.  His will was less powerful than his imagination.  Bold in conception, he was terribly slow in execution.  When his good sense showed him the opportunity, his imagination whispered, “Suppose the enemy has reserves of which I know nothing!  Is it not more prudent to wait until I receive more accurate information?” And so “I dare not,” inevitably waited on “I would.”  He forgot that in war it is impossible for a general to be absolutely certain.  It is sufficient, according to Napoleon, if the odds in his favour are three to two; and if he cannot discover from the attitude of his enemy what the odds are, he is unfitted for supreme command.

Before Yorktown McClellan’s five army corps had been held in check, first by 15,000 men, then by 58,000, protected by earthworks of feeble profile.* (* “No one but McClellan would have hesitated to attack.”  Johnston to Lee, April 22, 1862.  O.R. volume 11 part 3 page 456.) The fort at Gloucester Point was the key of the Confederate lines.* (* Narrative of Military Operations, General J.B.  Johnston pages 112 and 113.) McClellan, however, although a division was actually under orders to move against it, appears to have been unwilling to risk a failure.* (* The garrison consisted only of a few companies of heavy artillery, and the principal work was still unfinished when Yorktown fell.  Reports of Dr. Comstock, and Colonel Cabell, C.S.A.  O.R. volume 11 part 1.) The channel of the York was thus closed both to his transports and the gunboats, and he did nothing whatever to interfere with Johnston’s long line of communications, which passed at several points within easy reach of the river bank.  Nor had he been more active since he had reached West Point.  Except for a single expedition, which had dispersed a Confederate division near Hanover Court House, north of the Chickahominy, he had made no aggressive movement.  He had never attempted to test the strength of the fortifications of Richmond, to hinder