“But you must allow, Captain,” said I, “that Chancellorsville was a great victory—­and to-day’s battle also.”

“Chancellorsville was indeed a great victory,” said he; “but the enemy is as strong as ever.  I cannot suggest anything against Chancellorsville, except that I think that we should not have stopped on Sunday morning after taking the second line of intrenchments.  General Lee heard of Sedgwick’s movement just at the wrong time I dare say.  Should he not have pressed Hooker into the river before giving attention to Sedgwick[8]?”

[8] Captain Haskell is wrong here.  Hooker’s new position was impregnable to any attack the Confederates were then able to make.  Hooker himself, as well as his army, wished for the Confederates to attack.  Lee’s march against Sedgwick, at this juncture, was the right movement.  See the Comte de Paris, in loc. [ED.]

“Then you believe in attacking,” said I.

“True; I do under such circumstances.  The trouble with us has been that we attack resisting troops, and when we defeat them we refuse to trouble them any more:  we let them get away.  Yet, as you say, Chancellorsville was a great victory; anything that would have sent Hooker’s army back over the river, even without a battle, would have been success.  But speaking from a military view, I dare say it was a false movement to divide our forces as we did there.  We succeeded because our opponents allowed us to succeed.  It was in Hooker’s power on Saturday to crush either Jackson or McLaws.  Yet, as you suggest, General Lee was compelled to take great risks; no matter what he should do, his position seemed well-nigh desperate, and he succeeded by the narrowest margin.  Even on Sunday morning, before the action began, if General Lee had only known the exact condition below us at Fredericksburg, I dare say Hooker would in the end have claimed a victory, for General Lee would not have assaulted Hooker’s works.”

“But would he not have overcome Sedgwick?” I asked.

“Pardon me.  After Hooker’s defeat Lee could afford to march against Sedgwick, but not before.  I think he would have retreated.  We had enormous good fortune.  It was as great as at the first Manassas, when Beauregard, finding himself flanked by McDowell, won the battle by the steady conduct of a few regiments who held the enemy until Johnston’s men came up.  Of course I am not making any comparison between Generals Lee and Beauregard.  But Manassas and Chancellorsville are past, and observe, sir, what a loss we have had to-day.  I dare say the enemy’s loss is heavier, but he can stand losses here, and we cannot; another day or two like to-day, and we are ruined.  To beat back a corps of the enemy for a mile or so until it occupies a stronger position than before, is not—­you will agree with, me—­the defensive warfare which, the Confederacy began.  What can General Lee do to-morrow but attack?  He will attack, and I trust we shall defeat Meade’s army; but we cannot destroy it, and it will be filled up again long before we can get any reenforcement.  Indeed, Jones, I do not see how we can be reenforced at all—­so far from our base, and the enemy so powerful to prevent it.”