The temptation of political corruption may be more insistent when a large force of men is constantly employed, and when large supplies are constantly purchased, by public officials, but the temptation is not so strong or so centralized as it is in the granting of franchises to wealthy corporations. Public industry is weakened by the absence of certain motives to excellence that are present in private business. The income of public officials not being dependent on the economy of management, the spur and motives of competitive industry are lacking. No social discovery has made individual honesty and civic virtue useless to good government.
The decision in any specific case is one dependent on local conditions, and the exact limits of public ownership are not fixed. Industry is changing so rapidly that new adjustments are made every year. The main outlines of public ownership, however, are now in large part determined. Some industries do well, others ill, under public management, and between these lie many debatable cases. Waterworks and probably electric lighting, because of the comparative simplicity of their operation, are more suitable for public ownership than are gas works. No absolute line divides the one group from the other. But whatever the changes, the fact can not be ignored that the increase of public ownership is altering in manifold ways the organization of industry, and is reacting upon the production of wealth, and the distribution of incomes.
[Footnote 1: See above, ch. 16, sec. 5.]
[Footnote 2: See above, ch. 16, sec. 2, on the police function.]