The obvious measure of precaution and of justice would be to put any new rate into effect gradually.[13] The difficulties are of a political nature and in the desire of the party in power to “make a showing” at once of the results of its campaign pledges, in the one case by starting and stimulating industries through a higher tariff and in the other by reducing prices to consumers through a lower tariff. Under the new permanent tariff board, constituted to suggest tariff changes and to administer the tariff laws, it would be possible to apply some such feature.
[Footnote 1: See above, ch. 2, secs. 12, 13.]
[Footnote 2: In European countries, on the contrary, the rates that have been mainly effective have been those levied upon food products, and the agricultural landholders have been the “protected interests,” such as the England “landed aristocracy,” the German agrarian “Junkertum,” and the French peasant landowners.]
[Footnote 3: See above, ch. 13, sec. 2.]
[Footnote 4: See ch. 4, sec. 6 and ch. 13, secs. 6-10.]
[Footnote 5: In ch. 13, sec. 7.]
[Footnote 6: See ch. 4, secs. 4 and 9.]
[Footnote 7: That there is a certain measure of truth in this opinion is recognized in our discussion of the standard of deferred payments, ch. 6, sec. 9. But the relation of a world-wide appreciation of the standard money commodity with the burden that this change puts upon debtors has nothing to do with the question now before us, viz.: Does a protective tariff enable a country to keep and increase its proportion of the world’s stock of gold; and if it could, would it be a general benefit?]
[Footnote 8: See Vol. I, especially p. 228, and chs. 34 and 36.]
[Footnote 9: See on wages in times of crises, ch. 10, secs. 6 and 7; and on tariff changes, ch. 10, sec. 14, and ch. 15, sec. 13.]
[Footnote 10: See Vol. 1, pp. 361 and 443.]
[Footnote 11: See Vol. 1, p. 436, for average wheat prices in England, practically in the world-market.]
[Footnote 12: See above, sec, 8. On the next paragraph, see ch. 10, sec. 14.]


