the possibility of future improvements in the art
and theory of conduct, been necessarily led to note
some deficiencies in the existing moral sentiment.
This is always an unwelcome and invidious task.
Men do not like to be reminded of their moral failings,
and there is hardly any man, however critical he may
be of others, who, in the actual conduct of life,
does not appear to delude himself with the idea that
his own moral practice is perfect. I appeal,
however, from the unconscious assumptions of men to
their powers of reflexion, and I ask each man who reads
this book to consider carefully within himself whether,
on the principles here set out, much of the conduct
and many of the ethical maxims which are now generally
accepted do not admit of refinement and improvement.
In the sphere of morals, as in all other departments
of human activity, we are bound to do for our successors
what our predecessors were bound to do, and mostly
did, for us—transmit the heritage we have
received with all the additions and adaptations which
the new experiences and changing conditions of life
have rendered necessary or desirable.

