Obliviscence—­a very useful, discriminating phrase, which we first find employed in this volume—­(p. 259 et passim).  He defines Matter to be a permanent possibility of Sensation; he maintains that this is really all which (apart from philosophical theories) mankind in general mean by it; he shows that mere possibilities of sensation not only may, but must, according to the known Laws of Association, come to present ‘to our artificialized Consciousness’ a character of objectivity—­(pp. 198, 199).  The correlative subject, though present in fact and indispensable, is eliminated out of conscious notice, according to the Law of Obliviscence.

These chapters will well repay the most careful perusal.  We can only find room for one passage (pp. 214, 215):—­

’Throughout the whole of our sensitive life, except its first beginnings, we unquestionably refer our sensations to a me and not-me.  As soon as I have formed, on the one hand, the notion of Permanent Possibilities of Sensation, and on the other, of that continued series of feelings which I call my life—­both these notions are, by an irresistible association, recalled by every sensation I have.  They represent two things, with both of which the sensation of the moment, be it what it may, stands in relation; and I cannot be conscious of the sensation without being conscious of it as related to these two things.  They have accordingly received relative names, expressive of the double relation in question.  The thread of consciousness which I apprehend the relation as a part of, is called the Subject; the group of Permanent Possibilities of Sensation to which I refer it, and which is partially realized and actualized in it, is called the Object of the sensation.  The sensation itself ought to have a correlative name, or rather ought to have two such names—­one denoting the sensation as opposed to its Subject, the other denoting it as opposed to its Object; but it is a remarkable fact that this necessity has not been felt, and that the need of a correlative name to every relative one has been considered to be satisfied by the terms Object and Subject themselves.  It is true that these two are related to one another, but only through the sensation.  We have no conception of either Subject or Object, either Mind or Matter, except as something to which we refer our sensations, and whatever other feelings we are conscious of. The very existence of them both, so far as cognizable by us, consists only in the relation they respectively bear to our states of feeling. Their relation to each other is only the relation between those two relations.  The immediate correlatives are, not the pair, Object, Subject, but the two pairs, Object, Sensation objectively considered—­Subject, Sensation subjectively considered.  The reason why this is overlooked might easily be shown, and would furnish a good illustration of that