“Nay, if ye object to the question on the ground that a true ainswer will be criminating yoursel’, ye’ll be justified in so doing, by reason and propriety; but then ye’ll consider well the consequences it may have on your own case, when that comes to be investigated.”

“I object on gin’ral principles,” said Ithuel.  “Whatever Captain Rule may have said on the subject, admitting that he said anything, just to bear out the argument (by the way Ithuel called this word arg_oo_ment, a pronunciation against which we enter our solemn protest); admitting, I, say, that he said anything on the subject, it cannot be testimony, as hearsay evidence is ag’in law all the world over.”

The members of the court looked at the Judge Advocate, who returned the glance with an air of suitable gravity; then, on a motion of Sir Frederick’s, the court was cleared to discuss the point in private.

“How’s this, Mr. Judge Advocate?” demanded Cuffe, as soon as the coast was clear; “it is of the last importance to find where that lugger is—­do you hold that the question is contrary to law?”

“Its importance makes it pertinent, I think, sir, as for the legality, I do not see how it can be affected by the circumstance that the fact came up in discourse.”

“D’ye think so?” observed Sir Frederick, looking much more profound than was his wont.  “Legality is the boast of English law, and I should dislike excessively to fail in that great essential.  What is said must be heard, to be repeated; and this seems very like hearsay testimony.  I believe it’s admitted all round we must reject that.”

“What is your opinion, Captain Lyon?” demanded the president.

“The case is somewhat knotty, but it may be untied,” returned the Scot, with a sneer on his hard features.  “No need of Alexander and his sword to cut the rope, I’m thinking, when we bring common sense to bear on the point.  What is the matter to be ascertained?  Why, the place which was agreed on as the point of rendezvous between this Rawl Eevart and his people.  Now, this arrangement must have been made orally, or in writing; if orally, testimony to the words uttered will not be hearsay, further than testimony to what a man has seen will be eyesight.”

“Quite true, Mr. President and gentlemen!” exclaimed the Judge Advocate, who was not a little relieved at finding a clue to lead him out of the difficulty.  “If the agreement had been made in writing, then that writing would have to be produced, if possible, as the best evidence the case affords; but, being made in words, those words can be sworn to.”

Cuffe was much relieved by this opinion, and, as Sir Frederick did not seem disposed to push his dissent very far, the matter would have been determined on the spot, but for a love of disputation that formed part and parcel, to speak legally on a legal subject, of Lyon’s moral temperament.