“It is a thing equally deplorable and dangerous that there are, as many creeds as opinions among men, as many doctrines as inclinations, and as many sources of blasphemy as there are faults among us, because we make creeds arbitrarily and explain them as arbitrarily.  Every year, nay, every moon, we make new creeds to describe invisible mysteries; we repent of what we have done; we defend those who repent; we anathematize those whom we defend; we condemn either the doctrines of others in ourselves, or our own in that of others; and, reciprocally tearing each other to pieces, we have been the cause of each other’s ruin.”

These are not mere words; but the import of this self-accusation can be realized fully only by such as are familiar with the ecclesiastical history of those times.  As soon as the first fervor of Christianity as a system of benevolence had declined, dissensions appeared.  Ecclesiastical historians assert that “as early as the second century began the contest between faith and reason, religion and philosophy, piety and genius.”  To compose these dissensions, to obtain some authoritative expression, some criterion of truth, assemblies for consultation were resorted to, which eventually took the form of councils.  For a long time they had nothing more than an advisory authority; but, when, in the fourth century, Christianity had attained to imperial rule, their dictates became compulsory, being enforced by the civil power.  By this the whole face of the Church was changed.  Oecumenical councils—­parliaments of Christianity—­consisting of delegates from all the churches in the world, were summoned by the authority of the emperor; he presided either personally or nominally in them—­composed all differences, and was, in fact, the Pope of Christendom.  Mosheim, the historian, to whom I have more particularly referred above, speaking of these times, remarks that “there was nothing to exclude the ignorant from ecclesiastical preferment; the savage and illiterate party, who looked on all kinds of learning, particularly philosophy, as pernicious to piety, was increasing; " and, accordingly, “the disputes carried on in the Council of Nicea offered a remarkable example of the greatest ignorance and utter confusion of ideas, particularly in the language and explanations of those who approved of the decisions of that council.”  Vast as its influence has been, “the ancient critics are neither agreed concerning the time nor place in which it was assembled, the number of those who sat in it, nor the bishop who presided.  No authentic acts of its famous sentence have been committed to writing, or, at least, none have been transmitted to our times.”  The Church had now become what, in the language of modern politicians, would be called “a confederated republic.”  The will of the council was determined by a majority vote, and, to secure that, all manner of intrigues and impositions were resorted to; the influence of court females, bribery, and violence, were not spared.